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ABSTRACT
The purpose o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s  to  de term ine  whether  t h e  bene­
f i t s  der ived  from th e  c o s t  o f  employee pension plans  a r e  obse rvab le  
in  f i n a n c i a l  s ta t e m e n t  i n fo rm a t io n .  Since d i f f e r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta te m en t  r e a d e rs  use s ta te m en t  da ta  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  pr imary user  
group assumed i s  th e  l a b o r  group.
Pension p lans  r e q u i r e  ex p en d i tu re s  by f irms which may poten­
t i a l l y  a f f e c t  l a b o r  tu rn o v e r  and p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  th e re b y  a f f e c t i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  Rat io a n a l y s i s  i s  used in  t h i s  s tudy  to  
observe  the  e f f e c t s  o f  pension p lans  on g ran t in g  f i rm s .  F i f t e e n  
accoun t ing  r a t i o s  a r e  used ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h r e e  b as ic  c a t e g o r i e s  
f o r  r a t i o  a n a l y s e s .  Eight  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  f i v e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  
and two l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s  were observed  in  t h i s  r e s e a r c h .  The 
s t u d y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  to  observe  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  pens ion p lans  on 
f i r m s ’ f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
Data were c o l l e c t e d  from Standard  and P oor ' s  COMPUSTAT t a p e .  
APB Opinion,  No. 8 r e q u i r e s  t h a t  p lans  be d i s c lo s e d  a long with 
th e  p r o v i s io n ,  f o r  th e  p e r io d ,  o f  any pension c o s t .  All COMPUSTAT 
manufac tur ing  companies which began r e p o r t i n g  pension expense on 
t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  s ta tem en ts  with a l l  o t h e r  n e c e s sa ry  r a t i o  d a ta  
between 1969 and 1974 were inc luded  in  t h i s  s tu d y .
The accoun t ing  r a t i o s  u t i l i z e d  were s ta n d a rd iz e d  by d iv id in g  
th e  in d iv id u a l  f i r m ' s  r a t i o s  by a computed average  o f  t h a t  r a t i o .
viii
A t h r e e - y e a r  moving-average was computed f o r  each r a t i o .  The 
s t a n d a rd iz e d  average  r a t i o s  were p l o t t e d  fo r  each sampled f i rm .  
These p l o t s  were t r a c e d  a c ro ss  th e  y e a r  o f  plan i n i t i a t i o n  and 
grouped i n t o  s i x  b as ic  c l a s s e s —upward t re n d  begun, downward 
t r e n d  begun, a s t a b l e  (o r  n o n d i s c e rn ib l e )  t r e n d  begun, upward 
t ren d  co n t in u ed ,  downward t r e n d  c o n t in u e d ,  and a s t a b l e  (o r  
n o n d i s c e rn ib l e )  t r e n d  c o n t in u e d .
A o n e - to -o n e  comparison was made a c ro ss  th e se  same p e r iods  
with  m a tched -pa i rs  o f  f i rms no t  having pension p lans  and with  
m atched-pa i rs  o f  f irms which had pens ion plans  th roughou t  the  
time per iod  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  The m a tch ed -p a i rs  o f  t h e  two groups 
were s e l e c t e d  by t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and t o t a l  a s s e t  
s i z e .
S ix ty -s e v e n  manufacturing  f irms beginning pension plans  
were inc luded  in  th e  t e s t - g r o u p .  For each o f  th e  t h r e e  r a t i o  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  more than  80 pe rc en t  o f  t h e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  no n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  was ap p a re n t  a f t e r  th e  f i r m s '  y e a r  o f  
pens ion i n i t i a t i o n s .  The c h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  f o r  two independent  
samples was used to  examine the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between th e  t e s t -  
group and each o f  th e  co n t ro l  groups .  Each c o n t ro l  group showed 
th e  same percen tages  o f  movements ( p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e ,  o r  
" n e i t h e r " )  as t h e  t e s t - g r o u p .  No c h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  was made a f t e r  
th e  matched p a i r s  were combined with th e  t e s t - g r o u p  f i rm s .
The r e s u l t s  r e p o r t e d  in t h e s e  o b s e rv a t io n s  can only  be
co n s id e re d  a f t e r  the  t e s t - g r o u p  f i rm s  have been pa i red  with  companies 
in  both o f  th e  two c o n t ro l  groups .  The percen tages  o f  a c tu a l  s im i ­
l a r i t i e s  in  r a t i o s '  changes between the  two con t ro l  groups and th e  
t e s t - g r o u p  a re  sm a l l .  T h e re fo re ,  movements in the  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s  
appear  to  be caused by f a c t o r s  o t h e r  than  those  p r e s e n t  in  e i t h e r  o f  
the  two c o n t ro l  groups.
The major  conc lus ions  o f  t h i s  s tudy  a r e  l i s t e d  below:
1. P r o f i t a b i l i t y  (measured by p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s )  appears  no t  to  
be a f f e c t e d  a f t e r  the  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  pension p la n s .
2. Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y  (measured by l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s )
i s  no t  con s id e red  to  be a f f e c t e d  a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  pension p l a n s .
3. As with  the  o t h e r  two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  most o f  the  l i q u i d i t y  
r a t i o s  appear  no t  to  be a f f e c t e d  a f t e r  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n s .
4 .  The b e n e f i t s  to  th e  f i r m ' s  i n i t i a t i n g  p lans  appear  e i t h e r  to  
be a t  l e a s t  equal to  th e  c o s t  o f  t h e i r  pension b e n e f i t  p l a n s ,  o r  to  
have no r e l a t i o n s h i p  between r a t i o  changes and pension p lan  i n i t i a t i o n s .
x
CHAPTER I
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s  to  de termine  whether  th e  b e n e f i t s  
de r ived  from th e  c o s t  o f  employee pension p lans  a r e  obse rv ab le  in 
f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m en t  in fo rm a t io n .  Since d i f f e r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e ­
ment u se rs  may e v a lu a t e  p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  th e  pr imary 
u s e r  group assumed i s  t h e  l a b o r  group.
Employers and b u s in esses  have been concerned with  p rov id ing  
o th e r - th an -w ag e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  t h e i r  personnel  f o r  over  100 y e a r s .
"The e a r l i e s t  known i n d u s t r i a l  pension plan in  t h i s  co u n t ry  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  American Express Company in  1875 and th e  second 
by th e  Bal t imore  and Ohio R a i l road  f i v e  y e a r s  l a t e r . D u r i n g  r e c e n t  
y e a r s ,  growth in the  a rea  o f  employee b e n e f i t s  has i n c r e a se d  d ra m a t i ­
c a l l y .  " . . .  The g r e a t e s t  expans ion o f  th e se  b e n e f i t  programs 
occur red  dur ing  World War I I ,  l a r g e l y  as a r e s u l t  o f  wages being 
f ro z e n .  . "The wartime S t a b i l i z a t i o n  Act was passed in  October
1942, and th e  p r e s i d e n t i a l  o r d e r  to  'h o ld  th e  l i n e '  on p r i c e s  and
3
wages was i s su ed  in  April  1943." Because o f  t h e se  e v e n t s ,  "companies,  
which were d e s p e ra te  f o r  l a b o r ,  began to  compete f o r  t h e  s c a rc e  work­
e r s  by means o f  expanded employee b e n e f i t s  . .
1
2Accounting P r a c t i c e s  Evolve f o r  Pension Plans
One o f  the  major  a r e a s  o f  b e n e f i t s  w i th  which employers have 
always been concerned i s  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  employees . This  
concern has led  to  th e  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  o f  p r i v a t e  pension p lans  in  
most l a r g e  companies and in  many medium-sized and s m a l l e r  companies 
as  w e l l .  In a d d i t i o n  to  th e  wage f r e e z e ,  an I n t e r n a l  Revenue Code 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n  r e l a t i n g  to  pens ion t r u s t s  g r e a t l y  encouraged th e  
development o f  pension p lans  by employers .
The p ro v is io n s  o f  the  Code and subsequent  adm in is ­
t r a t i v e  r e g u l a t i o n s  have a f f e c t e d  every  im por tan t  a s p e c t  
o f  p r i v a t e  pens ion— th e  ta x  s t a t u s  o f  th e  f i n a n c i a l  sup­
p o r t ,  o f  inves tm ent  income i f  the  p lan  i s  funded ,  o f  the  
pension income to  b e n e f i c i a r i e s ,  and a l s o  o f  t h e  ch a ra c ­
t e r  o f  th e  p lans  them se lv es .  In a r r i v i n g  a t  n e t  income 
f o r  tax  pu rp o ses ,  employers a r e  p e rm i t ted  to  deduct  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  s u p p o r t  q u a l i f i e d  pension p l a n s ,  s u b j e c t  
to  the  l i m i t a t i o n s  imposed by the  I n t e r n a l  Revenue Code 
and th e  a p p l i c a b l e  r e g u l a t i o n s .  Income earned by a t r u s t  
forming p a r t  o f  a pens ion  p lan  i s  n o t  t a x a b le  to  th e  
t r u s t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t a x a t i o n  to  t h e  employee i s  d e f e r r e d  
u n t i l  a f t e r  r e t i r e m e n t . 5
In 1973, abou t  o n e - h a l f  o f  the  work fo rc e  was covered by some 
form o f  r e t i r e m e n t  p lan  o t h e r  than s o c ia l  s e c u r i t y  w h i le  o n ly  about  
35 y e a r s  e a r l i e r  l e s s  than 20 p e rc e n t  o f  t h a t  work f o r c e  was 
covered .  P r i v a t e  pension p lan  a s s e t s  in c r e a se d  from l e s s  than  
$3 b i l l i o n  in  1940 to  about  $150 b i l l i o n  in  1975. Noninsured pen­
s ion  plan  a s s e t s  ($33 b i l l i o n  in  1960) were over  $160 b i l l i o n  in 
1976.7 The a s s e t s  o f  p r i v a t e  pension funds have been growing f a s t e r  
than  th e  a s s e t s  o f  t h e i r  c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Two examples a r e  AT&T and
3General Motors in  1971. AT&T's pension fund a s s e t s  were va lued  a t  
o ve r  $9 b i l l i o n ,  and i t s  pension c o s t  exceeded $800 m i l l i o n .  The 
pension c o s t  o f  GM in c re a se d  by 77 p e rce n t  over  th e  preceding
Q
y e a r .  T h e re fo re ,  p r i v a t e  pension p lans  appear  to  be f a r - r e a c h i n g  
and im p o r tan t .
A survey  by Deaton and Weygandt r ev ea le d  t h a t  pension c o s t s  a r e  
very  l a r g e  f o r  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  f irms th ey  surveyed and appeared
Q
to  be growing a t  a more rap id  r a t e  than  n e t  income. " In  1968, no 
f irms surveyed had pension c o s t s  g r e a t e r  than  n e t  income, whereas 
in  1971, seven f irms had pension c o s t s  exceeding  100 p e rc e n t  o f  n e t  
income. Two f i rm s  r e p o r t e d  pension c o s t s  over  fo u r  t imes  g r e a t e r  
than  n e t  i n c o m e . " ^
Combined with  t h i s  tremendous growth in  the  s i z e ,  d i v e r s i t y ,  
and coverage o f  pension funds ,  th e  importance o f  t h e  pension p l a n ' s  
c o s t  in r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  th e  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  and o p e r a t io n s  o f  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  has g r e a t l y  i n c r e a s e d .
Employee b e n e f i t  p lans  w i th o u t  q u e s t i o n ,  have 
become a very im p o r tan t  segment o f  our  economy —
One i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  importance i s  the  
i n c r e a s i n g  m i l l i o n s  o r  b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  being 
a l l o c a t e d  to  them y e a r  a f t e r  y e a r  . . .
A second i n d i c a t i o n  i s  th e  growing number o f  
employees who a r e  covered by such p lans  . . .
And a t h i r d  i n d i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  v a r i e t y  o f  plans  
and th e  many a r e a s  they  cover—
11and they  co n t in u e  to  growl
4The extremely  complex i n t e r a c t i o n s  o f  s o c i a l ,  t a x ,  b u s in e s s ,  and 
le g a l  environments  a r e  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  accoun t ­
ing p r o f e s s i o n ' s  problems in  d e a l in g  with p e n s io n s .
Unti l  t h e  m id -1 9 6 0 ' s ,  accoun t ing  p r a c t i c e s  f o r  handl ing  pension
c o s t s  were q u i t e  d i v e r s e .
The APB's p r e d e c e s s o r ,  the  Committee on Accounting 
P rocedure ,  had p r ev io u s ly  d e a l t  w i th  accoun t ing  f o r  
c o s t s  o f  pens ion p lans  in  Accounting Research Bul­
l e t i n  No. 43, Chapter 13A, "Compensat ion-Pension- 
Annuity Costs Based on P a s t  S e r v i c e , "  and in  Account­
ing Research B u l l e t i n ,  No. 47 ,  "Accounting f o r  Costs 
o f  Pension P la n s . "  The s u b j e c t  was a l so  reviewed in  
Accounting Research S tudy,  No. 7 ,  by Paul Grady,
" In v e n to ry  o f  G enera l ly  Accepted Accounting P r i n c i ­
p le s  f o r  Business  E n t e r p r i s e s , "  and was examined in  
depth  in  Accounting Research S tudy ,  No. 8,  pub l ished  
in  196 6 .12
Since 1965, th e  v a r io u s  accoun t ing  p r a c t i c e s  con s id e red  a c c e p t ­
a b le  have d e c re a se d .  The even ts  which caused t h i s  d ec rea se  were 
t h e  AICPA's p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  Research Study,  No. 8 and th e  APB's 
i s su a n c e  o f  t h e i r  Opinion No. 8 in  1966, both e n t i t l e d  "Accounting 
f o r  t h e  Cost o f  Pension P la n s . "
In 1974, th e  Employee Ret i rem ent  Income S e c u r i t y  Act (ERISA) 
was passed by Congress ,  r e q u i r i n g  th e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  annual r e p o r t s  
f o r  employees '  b e n e f i t  p l a n s .  This law r e q u i r e s  a l l  p r i v a t e  r e t i r e ­
ment programs to  meet f e d e r a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  s t a n d a r d s .  The FASB 
began a s tudy  o f  pension plan  r e p o r t i n g  r e s u l t i n g  in an exposure 
d r a f t  f o r  p u b l i c  comment and d i s c u s s i o n .  The d r a f t  was e n t i t l e d ,  
"Accounting and Report ing  by Defined B e n e f i t  Pension P la n s . "  I f
5ad op ted ,  g e n e r a l l y  accep ted  accoun t ing  p r i n c i p l e s  would be e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  f o r  pension b e n e f i t  p l a n s .
The FASB concluded t h a t  pension plan p a r t i c i p a n t s  a re  th e  main 
u s e r s  f o r  whom th e  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  should  be d i r e c t e d .  The 
s ta t e m e n t s  should  provide  p a r t i c i p a n t s  with in fo rm a t ion  use fu l  in 
a s s e s s i n g  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e i r  accumulated b e n e f i t s .  A f t e r  ex­
amining o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  s ta te m e n t s  u s e r s ,  the  Board concluded t h a t  
p lan  f i n a n c i a l  s ta t e m e n ts  should  be p r im a r i l y  d i r e c t e d  to  p a r t i c i ­
pants  because o t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  have access  to  n ecessa ry  
in fo rm a t io n  through o t h e r  so u rc e s .
The O rgan iza t ion  Receives B e n e f i t s
The f u t u r e  o f  acco u n tan t s  and managers employed in  the  person­
nel a rea  w i l l  p o s s ib ly  be based on what Megginson c a l l s  the  "human 
re so u rce  co n ce p t , "  i .  e . ,  11. . . employees a r e  t r e a t e d  with  human
d i g n i t y  and w or th ,  but  t h e i r  o u tp u t  w i l l  be judged by th e  economic
13c r i t e r i a  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s . "  N ie ls  N ie l s e n ,  d i r e c ­
t o r  o f  compensation f o r  J .  C. Penney Company, i n d i c a t e d  t h a t ,  
" In s t e a d  o f  dreaming up new programs, employers have looked f o r  ways 
to  make money go f u r t h e r ,  to  p re se rve  the  va lue  o f  pension funds ,  to  
run p lans  b e t t e r ,  and to  communicate them b e t t e r .  The watchword 
seems to  be how to  g e t  more f o r  the  money sp en t  i n s t e a d  o f  how to 
spend more money.
I n v e s to r s  e x p ec t  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e t u r n s  on t h e i r  inves tm en t .
6S a t i s f a c t o r y  r e t u r n s  to  the  owners a r e  im por tan t  and n e cessa ry  goals  
bu t  o t h e r  goa ls  a r e  a l s o  c r i t i c a l  f o r  a company. Personal and e t h i c a l  
s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  s o c ia l  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and avoid ing  unnecessary  r i s k s  
might  be o t h e r  g o a l s .  I d e a l l y ,  as with any in v es tm en t ,  b e n e f i t s  paid 
to  employees would do more than a id  j u s t  th e  f i r m ' s  employees;  they  
would a l s o  a id  in  reach ing  many o f  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  g o a l s .
Since  i d e n t i f i e d  goa ls  a r e  a p a r t  o f  every  s u c c e ss fu l  o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n ,  management must i d e n t i f y  what i t  r e a l l y  wants .  Goals a l low 
th e  f i r m ' s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  to  make the  managerial d e c i s io n s  which would 
lead  to  a primary goal o f  most bus iness  o r g a n i z a t i o n s —-maximizing 
lo n g - ru n  p r o f i t s .  However, t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  goal o f  
maximum p r o f i t s  i s  n o t  enough to  be e f f e c t i v e .  Maximum p r o f i t s  a r e  
accomplished by co n t in u o u s ly  reach ing  many o t h e r  su b o rd in a te  c o rp o ra te  
g o a l s .
A t t r a c t i n g  and keeping q u a l i t y  personnel  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  goal 
f o r  e f f e c t i v e  and e f f i c i e n t  c o r p o r a t e  growth.  A f a i r  wage and bene­
f i t  package i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  ach ieve  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  company g o a l .
William J a f f e  s t a t e s ,  "F in an c ia l  remunera t ion  i s  being in c r e a s i n g l y  
viewed as an element in  th e  t o t a l  p rocess  o f  f u r t h e r i n g  th e  goals  o f  
th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and maximizing th e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l .  The 
g o a ls  a r e  ach ieved  through a t t r a c t i n g ,  r e t a i n i n g ,  m o t iv a t in g ,  u t i l i z i n g ,  
and developing  s u p e r i o r  t a l e n t . " ^  (Emphasis in  t h e  o r i g i n a l ) .
Communication. Another very  im p o r tan t  element in ach ie v in g  company
7goa ls  through employees i s  e f f e c t i v e  communication. Company p e r ­
sonnel who b e l i e v e  t h e  o r g a n iz a t io n  i s  a c t i v e l y  seeking e f f e c t i v e  
communication a re  more l i k e l y  to  respond p o s i t i v e l y  toward o r g a n iz a ­
t i o n  endeavors .  " I f  you want a winning company, be su re  your people
know the  s c o r e —or  they  can no t  help  you w in . " ^ 6 One company exper ienced
a n e g a t iv e  response  because o f  i n e f f e c t i v e  communication and poor 
employee a t t i t u d e s .
A C a l i f o r n i a  computer m anufac tu re r  grew r a p i d ly  
dur ing  th e  p a s t  decade w i thou t  u n io n iz a t io n  o f  i t s  
expanding r o s t e r  o f  employees. In r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  th e  
company con s id e red  i n s t a l l i n g  a p r o f i t  sh a r in g  
plan  f o r  i t s  p roduc t ion  w orkers ,  bu t  delayed such 
a c t i o n  in  o r d e r  to  plow maximum ea rn ings  back in to
o p e r a t i o n s .  L a s t  f a l l ,  d e s p i t e  the  l a s t  minute
implementat ion o f  a p r o f i t  sh a r in g  plan  and moves 
to  beef  up o t h e r  b e n e f i t s ,  the  company's p roduc t ion  
employees accep ted  a u n i o n ' s  i n i t i a l  o rg a n iz in g  d r i v e .
B e n e f i t  improvements were a key s e l l i n g  p o in t  f o r  th e  
un ion ,  and th e  workers su b seq u en t ly  handed th e  company 
i t s  f i r s t  s t r i k e  over  t h e  same i s s u e .
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  and s i m i l a r  c a s e s ,  c o r p o ra t e  managers ,  de­
s i r i n g  to r e c e i v e  " t h e i r  money's w or th ,"  a r e  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  job  
o f  e f f e c t i v e  communication i s  as  im por tan t  as  t h e  b e n e f i t  p l a n ' s  
des ign  and fund ing .  "The t r o u b l e  i s ,  while  many b e n e f i t  packages 
a r e  now p ro v id in g  g r e a t e r  va lue  t o  employee and employer a l i k e ,  few 
companies a re  communicating th e  u n d e r s tan d in g  o f  t h e i r  p lans  t h a t ' s  
v i t a l  to  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  both."^® Goals o f  t h e  f i rm  and th e  employees 
should  be known by both s i d e s .  N ie lsen  s t a t e s ,  " . . .  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  c o r p o ra t e  success  i s  very low i f  t h e r e  i s  an i n c o n s i s t e n c y  be-
19tween the  goa ls  o f  the  company and th e  va lue  systems o f  th e  employees."
8P r o f i t  s h a r in g  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  used as  a pension supplement o r  a 
method o f  funding pension p la n s .  For many companies ,  p r o f i t  s h a r in g  
and pension p lans  a r e  synonomous te rms .  These employee b e n e f i t s  a r e  
methods o f  merging employer and employee g o a l s .  "Management must 
recogn ize  th e  e s s e n t i a l  n a tu r e  o f  P r o f i t  S har ing— t h a t  i s  n o t  merely
a f l e x i b l e  way to  fund a r e t i r e m e n t  income program— but  a 'p eo p le
20o r i e n t e d  in c e n t i v e  management' program."
Proper  i n c e n t i v e  must be o f f e r e d  by o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  managements.  
However, i n c e n t i v e s  ( in c re a s e d  wages and b e n e f i t s ,  improved working 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  and o t h e r  s p e c ia l  s e rv i c e s  o f f e r e d  f o r  employees) may 
not  be enough s in c e  employee m o t iv a t io n  i s  personal  to  the  i n d i v i d u a l .  
Return on inves tm ent  i s  not  on ly  im por tan t  in  b u s in ess  d e c i s i o n ­
making but  r e t u r n  on in p u t  i s  a l s o  im por tan t  in employee d e c i s i o n ­
making. Employees must f ee l  th ey  are  r e c e iv in g  f a i r  b e n e f i t s  f o r  
t h e i r  p ro d u c t io n .  "Employees must see  and b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  
and p o t e n t i a l  rewards equal t h e i r  c u r r e n t  and f u t u r e  e f f o r t s . " 2  ^
Communicating th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  pension b e n e f i t  and p r o f i t  
sh a r in g  p lans  to  employees can provide  in fo rm a t ion  as to  what a c t i o n s  
management d e s i r e s .
Metzger quoted Richard Fernstrum,  a former p r e s i d e n t  o f  M P 
Pumps, Inc .
The b e n e f i t s  der ived  from P r o f i t  Shar ing  cannot  
be taken  away by complex r e p o r t i n g  sys tem s,  cannot  
be taken  away by adverse  tax  t r e a t m e n t .  None o f  
th e se  t h in g s  can in any way m i t i g a t e  th e  r e a l  and
9ever  p r e s e n t  va lue  o f  P r o f i t  S har ing .  Why? Be­
cause P r o f i t  Shar ing  i s  no t  a gimmick, i t  i s  no t  
a sum o f  money, i t  i s  no t  a pot o f  gold a t  the  
end o f  th e  rainbow.  To us i t  i s  a b a s i s  o f  com­
m u n ica t in g .
When we adopted a P r o f i t  Shar ing  plan  a t  M P 
Pumps, our  primary purpose was to  u n i t e  every  employee 
in  th e  company in  p u r s u i t  o f  a common goal which i s  
p r o f i t .  The goal was no t  to  avoid t a x a t i o n ,  i t  was 
no t  to  p lunder  t h e  worker ,  i t  was n o t  to  upse t  
work s t a n d a r d s ,  but  i t  was to  promote u n i ty  o f  
purpose w i th in  th e  e n t e r p r i s e . 22
P r o d u c t i v i t y . Wil liam Howell i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  pension p lans  a r e  i n ­
ves tm ents  in  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t h a t  pay f o r  themselves  in  th e  lo n g - ru n .  
Behavioral  s t u d i e s  i n d i c a t e  employees a r e  m ot iva ted  from w i th in  
themselves  and t h a t  t h e i r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  can be i n c r e a se d  by s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  with  t h e i r  work. The more in v es te d  in  pension funds ,  the  
more t h a t  should be cons ide red  in v e s te d  in  bus iness  and p r o d u c t i v i t y .  
" I t  f o l l o w s ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  i f  q u a l i f i e d  pension p lans  a re  a form o f  
d e f e r r e d  compensat ion,  t h e i r  inves tm ent  c o n s t i t u t e s  t h e  b ig g e s t  
f a c t o r  o f  improved p r o d u c t i v i t y — a c c e l e r a t e d  c a p i t a l  fo rm at ion  with  
in c r e a se d  inves tm en t  in  l a b o r - s a v in g  and q u a l i t y - c o n t r o l l i n g  ma­
c h in e r y .  A ccord ing ly ,  to  th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  fund managers ‘ i n v e s t
in  p r o d u c t i v i t y , 1 pension p lans  (on a macroeconomic s c a l e )  tend in
23t h e  long run to  pay f o r  themselves  (S IC)."  " P r o d u c t i v i t y  w i l l
have a g r e a t e r  impact on p r i v a t e  pension b e n e f i t s ,  o f  c o u r se ,  i f
pension p lans  have a f a v o ra b le  e f f e c t  on p r o d u c t i v i t y .  T h e re ' s  a
24r e c i p r o c a t i n g ,  c a u s e - e f f e c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  two."  Howell 
f u r t h e r  s t a t e s ,  “Two s t u d i e s  o f  the  P r o f i t  Shar ing  Research Founda-
10
t i o n  a c t u a l l y  show t h a t  p lans  f o r  s h a r in g  p r o f i t s  w i th  employees
or
tend to  i n c r e a s e  th e  p r o f i t s  remaining a f t e r  s h a r i n g . "  (Em­
p has is  in  the  o r i g i n a l ) .
Every o r g a n i z a t i o n  must de term ine  i t s  own goals  and t h e  e f f o r t s  
needed to  ach iev e  them. Employee b e n e f i t s  a r e  no e x c e p t io n .  "What 
plan sponsors  r e a l l y  need to  do i s  to  dec ide  where, and in what 
amounts,  to  put  t h e i r  money so t h a t  i t  may produce th e  optimum 
s h o r t - r a n g e  and maximum lo n g - ra n g e  r e t u r n  f o r  d o l l a r s  s p e n t ,  measured
pc
in  terms o f  employee p r o d u c t i v i t y  and c o r p o ra t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y . "  
Employee b e n e f i t s  a r e  not  mere payments f o r  s e r v i c e s  r e n d e red .  
P roper ly  u t i l i z e d ,  th ey  a r e  im p o r tan t  t o o l s  f o r  a d m in i s t e r in g  com­
p a n ie s .  " I f  employers b e l i e v e  t h a t  money does t a l k ,  they  must f in d  
o u t  what th e  words a r e  t h a t  employees unders tand  and respond t o .
They must dec ide  in  advance what a c t i o n s  they  want t h e  money to  
27produce ."  I n d iv id u a l  employee goals  and th e  employee b e n e f i t  goa ls  
can and must be in  l i n e  with t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  major o p e ra t io n a l  
g o a l s .
A n a l y s i s . L ieber  and Dragutsky s t a t e  what they  c o n s id e r  th e  " t r u e
pension c o s t "  to  be.
Without c o n s id e r in g  t a x e s ,  th e  t r u e  c o s t  o f  a 
pension plan to  an employer in c lu d e s  th e  fo l lo w ­
in g :
The b e n e f i t s  p a i d ,  i n c lu d in g  a l l  d isbursem ents  made 
on accoun t  o f  r e t i r e m e n t ,  t e r m in a t io n  o f  employment,  
d i s a b i l i t y  o r  dea th  b e fo re  r e t i r e m e n t
11
plus
Expenses i n c u r re d  fo r  a l l  s e r v i c e s  in  connec t ion  
w ith  t h e  plan o p e r a t i o n ,  i n c lu d in g  r e a l i z e d  l o s s e s  
on inves tm ents
1 ess
Earnings on the  pension fund,  i n c lu d in g  d iv idends  
and i n t e r e s t  as  well  as  r e a l i z e d  inves tm en t  g a in s .
The s ta t e m e n t s  o f  t h e s e  au th o r s  a r e  l i m i t e d  in  t h a t  th ey  con­
s i d e r  on ly  the  e x p e n d i tu r e  a s p e c t s  o f  pension c o s t .  They ignore  
t h e  p o s s ib l e  b e n e f i t s  t h e  g r a n t in g  f i rm  r e c e i v e s  from th e  pension 
p l a n ' s  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  who a r e  t h e  company's employees.
Employee b e n e f i t s  h o p e fu l ly  would be i n s t i t u t e d  f o r  th e  b e n e f i t
o f  both the  f i rm  and th e  i n d i v i d u a l s  covered .  Firms d e s i r e  to  meet
t h e i r  s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  t h e i r  employees, e s p e c i a l l y  when
the  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i s  a l s o  b e n e f i t e d .  " In  on ly  a r e l a t i v e l y  few
in s t a n c e s  have workers th rough group a c t i o n  (SIC) developed t h e i r
own o ld -a g e  income p l a n s .  In th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  cases  the  i n i t i a t i v e
was provided by c o r p o ra t e  m a n a g e m e n t . P e n s i o n  p lans  may be o f f e r e d
to  help  i n c r e a s e  employee mora le  and s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  to  he lp  reduce
l a b o r  t u r n o v e r ,  to  i n c r e a s e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  and worker  l o y a l t y ,  and to
draw q u a l i t y  workers  to  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
In e a r l i e r  days ,  aged employees u s u a l l y  had been kept  
on th e  p a y r o l l — al though  o f te n  in  r e l a t i v e l y  l i g h t  
work. In t h e  t w e n t i e t h  c e n tu r y ,  however, management 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  looked to  pens ions  as  a means o f  improving 
o p e r a t in g  e f f i c i e n c y  o r  o f  r e a l i z i n g  t h e  i n t a n g i b l e — 
goodw i l l .  R a i l r o a d s ,  l i a b l e  to  l a r g e  damage s u i t s  
r e s u l t i n g  from t r a f f i c  a c c i d e n t s ,  developed pension 
p lans  to  remove aged workers in  an o r d e r l y  f a sh io n  as
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they  presumably became c a r e l e s s  and l e s s  e f f i c i e n t .
Some managements hoped a pension plan  would c o n t r i ­
bute  to  th e  development o f  a s t a b l e ,  loya l  work 
f o r c e .  Others  saw in  pensions  a means to  reduce 
s t r i k e s  and p o s s ib ly  to  r e s t r a i n  f u r t h e r  growth in 
t r a d e  u n io n s .  F i n a l l y ,  in  some cases  management 
b e l ie v ed  pension p lans  would no t  on ly  a t t r a c t  s u p e r i o r  
workers bu t  a l s o  improve th e  morale  o f  employees as 
well  as  enhance in  th e  eyes o f  t h e  p u b l ic  t h e  com­
pany 's  r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  humaneness.30
F r e q u en t ly ,  f i rm s  under take  p r o j e c t s  which might  no t  add to 
cash in f lows  but  c o n t r i b u t e  to  r e t u r n s  by reducing  f u tu r e  expendi­
t u r e s .  C o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  widely  used in  an a ly z in g  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  As mentioned in  a p rev ious  s e c t i o n ,  pension c o s t s  
a r e  q u i t e  high and r e p r e s e n t  a major  e x p e n d i tu re  o f  b u s in e s s e s .  
Corporate  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  f r e q u e n t l y  use methodical c o s t / b e n e f i t  
procedures  in  making c a p i t a l  inves tm en t  and o t h e r  inves tm ent  d e c i ­
s i o n s .  S im i la r  an a ly se s  o f  v a r io u s  types  o f  b e n e f i t  p lans  and 
d i f f e r e n t  f a c e t s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  type  o f  employee b e n e f i t  plan a re  
a l so  e s s e n t i a l .  In d i s c u s s in g  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  v a r io u s  employee 
b e n e f i t s  N ie lsen  w ro te ,  " I f  management were faced  with  a s i m i l a r  
cho ice  in  terms o f  i n v e s t i n g  in new machinery ,  develop ing  a new 
p ro d u c t ,  o r  conduc t ing  a new a d v e r t i s i n g  campaign, i t  would have 
s p e c i f i c  in fo rm a t io n  about  what comparat ive  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  to  expec t
Ol
from th e se  a l t e r n a t i v e s . "  Company managements a r e  aware o f  th e  
obvious p o s i t i v e  a s p e c t s  o f  f r i n g e  b e n e f i t  p lans  to  t h e i r  employees 
while  working and in  r e t i r e m e n t .  Employee compensation b e n e f i t s  
can o f f e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e t u r n s  to  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  f o r  i t s  d o l l a r s
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s p e n t ,  as  well as to  th e  employees. Labor i s  aware o f  t h e s e  po ten­
t i a l  r e t u r n s  and uses  f i n a n c i a l  data  to  e v a lu a t e  the  p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t s  
o f  b e n e f i t  p l a n s .  I n t e l l i g e n t  managers a re  a l so  aware o f  t h i s  f a c t .
A lo g i c a l  deduc t ion  would be t h a t  bus iness  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a r e  ex­
p e c t in g  some s i g n i f i c a n t ,  measurable  r e t u r n  to  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  As 
a r e s u l t ,  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n t  u se rs  should be a b l e  t o  n o t i c e  t h i s  
improvement in th e  r e t u r n s  o f  th e  b u s in e s s .  In o rd e r  to  de termine  
whether  th e se  b e n e f i t s  a re  p r e s e n t ,  t h i s  s tudy  examines f i n a n c i a l  
s ta t e m e n t  da ta  o f  c e r t a i n  companies which s t a r t e d  pension p lans  f o r  
t h e i r  employees.
Labor Uses F inanc ia l  In form at ion
A number o f  d i v e r s e  groups e x i s t  who a r e  p o t e n t i a l  u se r s  o f  a 
f i r m ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  Among th e s e  a re  th e  owners and manage­
ment,  c r e d i t o r s  and p o t e n t i a l  c r e d i t o r s ,  l a b o r  and l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  
r e g u l a t o r y  b o d ie s ,  and perhaps even c e r t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l s  in  the  general  
p u b l i c .  "Various  groups such as  s h a r e h o l d e r s ,  c r e d i t o r s ,  employees , 
t a x  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  customers and s u p p l i e r s  have c o n t in u in g  and sometimes
c o n f l i c t i n g  r e l a t i o n s  with a company and depend upon i t s  r e p o r t s  to
32d i s c l o s e  m a t t e r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s . "  Accountants  
and managers a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  s t r i v i n g  to  f u l f i l l  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
to th e se  groups through r e p o r t i n g  in  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  f i n a n c i a l  
r e p o r t s .  "Corpora te  o f f i c i a l s  and spokesmen have r e p e a t e d ly  a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  th e  c o rp o ra t io n  in our  s o c i e ty  i s  s o c i a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e ,  and 
t h a t  t h i s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  m an ifes ted  by the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  t h e
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needs o f  th e  community, s t o c k h o l d e r s ,  c r e d i t o r s ,  government,  em­
p lo y e e s ,  and o t h e r s . " 33 Thi.s s tudy  focuses  on the  l a b o r  group,  i . e . ,
employees.
Labor has used the  f i n a n c i a l  s ta tem en ts  o f  i t s  employers s in c e  
th e  t ime o f  the  C iv i l  War.3^ R ecen t ly ,  " c o rp o ra te  f i n a n c i a l  informa­
t i o n  has been s e r i o u s l y  sought  and used"36 by l a b o r .  "Labor . . .
has o rgan ized  r e se a r c h  and educa t ion  depar tments  which g a th e r  and 
ana lyze  c o r p o ra t io n  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  Host l a b o r  . . . has th e  
f a c i l i t i e s  and i n t e r e s t s  to  s tudy  th e  o p e r a t io n s  o f  th e  companies 
w ith  which they  have c o n t r a c t s . " 36 "Wages, a b i l i t y  to  pay,  produc­
t i v i t y ,  t h e  economy, budge ts ,  and c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  a r e  f a c t o r s  l a b o r  as 
well  as management i n c o r p o r a t e s  i n t o  i t s  d e c i s i o n s . " 3^
"All too  o f t e n  . . . ( l a b o r )  and management view each o th e r  as
th e  ' o p p o s i t i o n 1 or  as n ec e s sa ry  e v i l s ,  when th e  a c tu a l  f a c t  i s  t h a t
each i s  dependent on th e  o t h e r . " 38 Labor and management use th e
in fo rm at ion  in a s i m i l a r  manner.  Both examine p as t  r e s u l t s  as  a
39b a s i s  f o r  f u tu r e  d e c i s i o n s .  " P r o f i t - s h a r i n g  agreem ents ,  pension 
p l a n s ,  w e l f a re  fu n d s ,  and p o s s ib ly  th e  annual wage, a l l  p r e se n t  ac­
c oun t ing  problems f o r  t h e  company and la b o r  . . . ,  and f o r  th e  
a u d i t o r s
Tomczyk has w r i t t e n  t h a t  l a b o r  examines f i n a n c i a l  in fo rm at ion  o f  
f i rms to  de termine  i f  th e  f irm i s  a b le  to  pay in c reased  b e n e f i t s .  
"Because each demand made by unions dur ing  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  ba rga in ing  
process  has a c o s t  a t t a c h e d  to  i t ,  l a b o r  union l e a d e r s  a l s o  f e e l  
t h a t  they  have a s o c ia l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  i n t e l l i g e n t l y  j u s t i f y
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t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  proposal s . 11 ^  Labor f o rc e s  a r e  powerful in c e r t a i n
i n d u s t r i e s  and f i r m s .  The employees may be in  need but  " th e  economic
h e a l t h  o f  th e  f i rm  a n d /o r  i n d u s t r y  s e t s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  l i m i t  on union 
42demands." S ta tem ents  o f  v a r io u s  w r i t e r s  seem to  imply t h a t  even l a b o r  
examines th e  economic as  well  as t h e  s o c ia l  impact o f  t h e i r  r e q u e s t s .  
"The f e e l i n g  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  i n t e l l i g e n t l y  j u s t i f y  c o n t r a c t  p ro­
p o sa ls  probably  bears  more h e a v i ly  on th e  union consc ience  than on 
43management 's ."  "Corpora te  f i n a n c i a l  da ta  have been inc luded  among 
th e  v a r ious  d a ta  sought  by unions  to  measure and j u s t i f y  th e  c o s t  o f  
t h e i r  c o n t r a c t  p r o p o s a l s . " ^ 4 (Emphasis added) .  Labor conducts  r e ­
s e a rc h  to de te rm ine  i f  i t s  company i s  ea rn in g  a f a i r  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n
on c a p i t a l  i n v e s t e d  and i f  i n c r e a s e s  in  b e n e f i t s  can be a f fo rd e d  o r
"whether  a d e c re a se  may be n e c e s s a r y ,  o r  whether  th e  company can
absorb  a ( n ) . . . i n c r e a s e  through in c r e a se d  p r o d u c t i v i t y  o r  by
r a i s i n g  p r i c e s .
The f i n a n c i a l  s ta t em en t s  a re  u n l i k e l y  to  prov ide  a l l  o f  th e
n e cessa ry  d a ta  f o r  e i t h e r  d e c i s i o n ;  however, they  w i l l  p rov ide  much
o f  the  bas ic  in fo rm a t io n  needed f o r  p roper  a n a l y s i s .  "They ( f i n a n c i a l
r e p o r t s )  a r e  l i k e l y  to  focus on compara t ive  l e v e l s  o f  s a l e s ,  c o s t s  o f
m anufac tu re ,  p r o d u c t s ,  management p o l i c i e s ,  inves tm en t  p r a c t i c e s ,
merchandis ing  programs,  a d v e r t i s i n g  p o l i c i e s ,  des ig n in g  problems,
management o v erhead ,  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  competence, and th e  h o s t  o f  o th e r
46a s p e c t s  o f  an in d iv id u a l  b u s in e s s . "  Nader and Blackwell r e c e n t l y  
encouraged workers to  r e q u e s t  even more in fo rm a t ion  and to  become
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more a c t i v e  in d i s c u s s io n s  with  employers and unions concern ing  t h e i r  
pension p l a n s '  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o r  p o s s i b l e  improvements.  " I t  should  
be noted . . . t h a t  th e  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  ' v a s t  i n c r e a s e s  in  c o s t s '  
un iformly  p r e d i c t e d  by employers and unions t h a t  oppose b e t t e r  v e s t ­
ing and funding has never  been proved.  There i s  reason to  b e l i e v e
t h a t  c o s t  i s  n o t  the  o v e r r i d i n g  problem in improving pens ion plans
47t h a t  i t  i s  o f t e n  pu rpo r ted  to  be ."  "In  a l l  e v e n t s ,  you should  be 
wary when your  employer o r  union t a l k s  to  you about  the  ' v a s t  i n ­
c r e a s e s '  in c o s t  o f  improved p lans  and t h r e a t e n s  you w i th  reduced 
b e n e f i t s .  Ask f o r  f a c t s  and f i g u r e s  and d o n ' t  be s a t i s f i e d  with
sweeping s ta t e m e n t s  such as  f r e q u e n t l y  meet employees '  arguments f o r
48b e t t e r  pension p l a n s . "  With t h e s e  ideas  in  mind, t h e  fo l low ing
recommendation has been made to  ac co u n ta n ts  and managers in  p rov id ing
da ta  to  employees . "Meaningful r a t i o s ,  c o s t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i n d u s t r y
compar isons ,  and in dex- type  da ta  can a l l  be employed in  r e p o r t  or
4Qn e w s l e t t e r  fo rm .1 
Summary
Business  o r g a n iz a t io n s  a r e  spending a l a r g e  sum o f  d o l l a r s  
a n n u a l ly  on pension b e n e f i t  p lans  f o r  t h e i r  employees.  E f f i c i e n c y  
and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  in managing t o d a y ' s  f irms r e q u i r e  u t i l i z a t i o n  
o f  p redetermined company g o a l s .  Many sub -goa ls  must be c o n s t a n t l y  
achieved befo re  the  c o rp o ra te  goal o f  p r o f i t  maximizat ion i s  r e a l i z e d .  
F a i r  wage and b e n e f i t  packages a r e  e s s e n t i a l  in m a in ta in in g  q u a l i t y
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p e r so n n e l .  A t t r a c t i n g  and keeping q u a l i t y  personnel  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  
goal f o r  c o r p o ra te  p r o g re s s .
J a f f e  s t a t e d ,  " .  . . b e n e f i t s  a r e  p lay ing  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  more
im p o r tan t  r o l e  in  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  companies to  a t t r a c t ,  r e t a i n ,  and
50m o t iv a te  key em ployees .” Corporate  managers d e s i r i n g  to  r e c e iv e  
'’t h e i r  money's worth" a r e  r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  job  o f  e f f e c t i v e  com­
munica t ion  may be as  im por tan t  as t h e  b e n e f i t  p l a n ' s  des ign  and 
fund ing .  Most l i k e l y ,  company personnel  who b e l i e v e  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  
i s  a c t i v e l y  seek ing  e f f e c t i v e  communication w i l l  respond p o s i t i v e l y  
toward o r g a n iz a t io n  endeavors .  Pension and p r o f i t  sh a r in g  plans  have 
in c re a se d  th e  p r o f i t s  remaining a f t e r  the  p l a n s '  funding .  P ro p e r ly  
u t i l i z e d ,  b e n e f i t  p lans  a r e  im p o r ta n t  t o o l s  f o r  managing companies .
Managers o f  companies a r e  very aware o f  c o s t s  to t h e i r  f i rms 
and c o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  a widely  accep ted  p r a c t i c e .  The obvious 
b e n e f i t  i s  to  the  employees and t h e i r  s e c u r i t y  a t  r e t i r e m e n t  age .  
Employee compensation b e n e f i t s  can a l s o  o f f e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e t u r n s  to  
th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
Labor,  as well  as  management, uses f i n a n c i a l  s ta t e m e n t  da ta  f o r  
e v a l u a t i o n s .  Company employees a r e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  seek ing  d a ta  f o r  
making a n a l y s e s .  S ta tem ents  o f  v a r io u s  w r i t e r s  imply t h a t  even l a b o r  
c o n s id e r s  t h e  economic,  as  well  as  t h e  s o c i a l ,  impact o f  t h e i r  r e ­
q u e s t s ,  Much o f  the  economic da ta  needed by management and employees 
f o r  a s s e s s i n g  th e  impact  o f  c o r p o ra t e  d e c i s io n s  a r e  co n ta in ed  in  t h e
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o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
The purpose o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s  to  de te rm ine  whether  the  b e n e f i t s  
d e r iv ed  from th e  c o s t  o f  employee pension p lans  a r e  o b se rv ab le  in 
f i n a n c i a l  s t a te m e n t  in fo rm a t io n .  Since d i f f e r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n t  
u se rs  may e v a l u a t e  p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  primary u se r  
group assumed i s  the  l a b o r  group.
FOOTNOTES
Chapter I
1. Char les  Lee Gear ing,  I n d u s t r i a l  Pensions  (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings I n s t i t u t e ,  1954),  p.  35
2 .  Leon G. Megginson, Personnel and Human Resources Adminis­
t r a t i o n  (3d e d . ;  Homewood: Richard D. I rw in ,  I n c .  1977),  p.  446.
3. Char les  Lee Dear ing,  I n d u s t r i a l  Pensions  (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings I n s t i t u t e ,  1954) p. 47.
4. Leon G. Meggison, Personnel and Human Resources Adminis- 
t r a t i o n  ( rd e d . ;  Homewood: Richard D. I rw in ,  I n c . ,  1977) ,  p.  446.
5. Char les  Lee Dear ing,  I n d u s t r i a l  Pensions  (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings I n s t i t u t e ,  1954),  p. 36.
6 . Lawrence L ieber  and Howard W. Dragutsky,  "How Accountants  
Can Keep Pension Costs Down," Journal  o f  Accountancy, February  1975, 
p.  52, c i t i n g  in  t u r n ,  L i fe  Insu rance  Fact  Book 1973.
7. Glenn Welsch, Charles  Z la tk o v ic h ,  and Walter  H a r r i so n ,  
In te rm e d ia te  Accounting (5 th  ed.*, Homewood: Richard D. I rw in ,
I n c . ,  1979),  p.  724, c i t i n g  in  t u r n ,  The U. S. Fac t  Book (New York: 
G rosse t  and Dunlap, 1978),  p.  332.
8 . Walter  B. Meigs and o t h e r s ,  In te rm e d ia te  Accounting (3d. 
e d . ;  New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974) ,  p.  714.
9. William C. Deaton and J e r r y  J .  Weygandt, " D isc lo su re s  
Rela ted  to  Pension Plans" Journal  o f  Accountancy ( Ja n u a ry ,  1975),  
p.  47.
10. I b id .
11. Walter  E. K l i n t ,  " C o l l e c t i v e  Barga in ing  on B e n e f i t s  from 
th e  Employer 's  P o in t  o f  View," Pension and Welfare News (May 1968),  
p. 49.
12. Reuben W. Abrams, "Accounting f o r  the  Cost o f  Pension Plans 




13. Leon G. Megginson, Personnel and Human Resources Adminis­
t r a t i o n  (3d e d . ;  Homewood: Richard D. I rw in ,  I n c . ,  1977),  p .  6'86.
14. N ie ls  H. N ie l s e n ,  "The Art  o f  Compensation and B e n e f i t  
Plan Design," Pension World ( J u ly  1077) ,  p.  28.
15. Wil liam A. J a f f e ,  "O rgan iza t ion  o f  th e  Employee B e n e f i t  
F unc t ion ,"  Pension and Welfare News (November 1969),  pp. 55-56.
16. B e r t  L. Metzger ,  "How to  Motivate  with  P r o f i t  S h a r in g ,"  
Pension World (February  1978) ,  p.  28.
17. Will iam R. Wood, "Are You G e t t in g  Your Money's Worth from 
Employee B en e f i t s ? "  Pension and Welfare News (November 1967) p. 28.
18. I b i d . ,  p.  27
19. N ie ls  H. N ie l s e n ,  "The Art  o f  Compensation and B e n e f i t  
Plan Design," Pension World ( J u ly  1977) ,  p.  29.
20. B e r t  L. Metzger ,  "How to  Motivate  w ith  P r o f i t  S h a r in g , "  
Pension World (February  1978) ,  p. 28.
21.  N ie ls  H. N e i l s e n ,  "The Art  o f  Compensation and B e n e f i t  
Plan Design,"  Pension World, p.  30.
22. Ber t  L. Metzger ,  "Hot to  Motivate  with P r o f i t  S h a r in g ,"  
Pension World (February  1978) ,  pp. 24-25 ,  c i t i n g  in t u r n ,  Richard 
Fernst rum.
23. James M. Howell,  "Labor/Management R e la t io n s  and P r o f i t s , "  
Pension World (February 1978),  p. 21.
24. I b i d . ,  p. 20.
25. I b i d . ,  p.  23.
26. N ie ls  H. N ie l s e n ,  "The A r t  o f  Compensation and B e n e f i t  
Plan Design,"  Pension World ( J u ly  1977) ,  p.  29.
27. I b i d . ,  p.  29.
28. Lawrence L ieber  and Howard W. Dragutsky,  "How Accountants  
Can Keep Pension Costs Down," Journa l  o f  Accountancy, February 1975, 
pp. 52-53,
29. Char les  Lee Dear ing,  I n d u s t r i a l  Pensions  (Washington,  D.C.: 
The Brookings I n s t i t u t e ,  1954) ,  p". 30.
30. I b i d . ,  p .  38.
21
31. Niels H. Nei lsen,  "The Art  o f  Compensation and Benef i t  
Plan Design," pensfon World ( Ju ly  1977), p. 31.
32. Bertrand Horwitz and Reza Shabahang, "Published Corporate 
Accounting Data and General Wage Increases  o f  the  Firm," The 
Accounting Review (A pr i l ,  1971), p. 244, c i t i n g  in t u rn ,  Robert 
Whitman, "A Financial  Executive Views Accounting Developments,"
(John Burton, e d . ) ,  Corporate Financial  Report ing: C onf l ic t s  and 
Challenges, A Symposium (American I n s t i t u t e  o f  C e r t i f i e d  Public 
Accountants ,  1969), pp. 126-128.
33. ___________, Published Corporate Accounting Data and General
Wage Increases  o f  the Firm," The Accounting Review (April  1971),
p. 243.
34. Wilbur F. P i l l s b u r y ,  "Organized Labor's Views o f  Corporate 
Financial  Information ,"  Journal o f  Accountancy (June 1958), p. 46.
35. Ib id .
36. Ib id .
37. Richard D. H i l l e r ,  "Accounting and Labor R e la t io n s - -  
I n t e r r e l a t e d  R e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s , "  Management Accounting (November 
1971), p.  18.
38. I b id ,  p.  19.
39. Wilbur F. P i l l s b u r y ,  "Organized Labor's  Views o f  Corporate 
Financial  Information,"  Journal o f  Accountancy (June 1958), p. 46-
47.
40. J .  B. C. Woods, "The Accountant ' s  Role in Labor-Management 
R e la t io n s ,"  New York CPA (August 1954), p.  505.
41. Stephen Henry Tomczyk, "Financial Ratios and the A b i l i t y  to 
Pay Wage In c re a se s , "  (D.B.A. unpublished d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Univers i ty
o f  Kentucky, 1975), p. 16.
42. Ted M. Rabun, "Accounting and Labor R e la t io n s ,"  Management 
Accounting (January 1966), p. 17.
43. Harold Jack,  "The Accountant 's  Role in Labor R e la t io n s ,"  
Management Accounting (October 1970), p. 57.
44. Stephen Henry Tomczyk, Financial  Ratios and the  A b i l i t y  to 
Pay Wage In c reases ,"  (D.B.A. unpublished d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  Univers i ty  o f  
Kentucky, 1975), p. 16.
22
45. Wilbur F . P i l l s b u r y ,  "Organized L ab o r ' s  Views o f  Corporate 
F inanc ia l  I n fo rm a t io n ,"  Journal  o f  Accountancy (June 1958) ,  p.  55.
46. Solomon B ark in ,  " F in an c ia l  S ta tem ent  in  C o l l e c t i v e  Bar­
g a i n in g , "  New York CPA ( J u ly  1953) ,  p.  445.
47. Ralph Nader and Kate B lackw el l ,  You and Your P ens ion ,
(New York: Grossman P u b l i s h e r s ,  1973),  p. 130.
48. I b i d . ,  pp. 130-131.
49. Richard D. M i l l e r ,  "Accounting and Labor R e la t i o n s — 
I n t e r r e l a t e d  R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , "  Management Account ing (November 
1971),  p.  16.
50. William A. J a f f e ,  "O rgan iza t ion  o f  t h e  Employee B e n e f i t  
F u n c t io n ,"  Pension and Welfare News (November 1969) ,  pp. 55-56.
CHAPTER r i
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Since c o s t  and b e n e f i t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  u t i l i z e d  in e v a lu a t in g  
both e x i s t i n g  p r o j e c t s  and p o t e n t i a l  p r o j e c t s ,  managers should s im i ­
l a r l y  ana lyze  the  c o s t  o f  pension p l a n s .  Management should  expect  
b e n e f i t s  to  accrue  to  the  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  These b e n e f i t s  may be s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  and should  be m easurab le .
Pension plans  might prov ide  th e  g r a n t in g  f irm with  such b e n e f i t s  
as  in c r e a s e d  employee morale  and s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  reduced la b o r  t u r n ­
o v e r ,  and in c rea sed  la b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  T h e re f o re ,  improvements in 
employee morale  and s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  l a b o r  t u r n o v e r ,  and p r o d u c t i v i t y  
r e s u l t i n g  from a pens ion plan should  be r e f l e c t e d  in  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  
o f  the  f i rm .  Since  t h e se  e f f e c t s  should  be cap tu red  in  accoun t ing  
s ta t e m e n t  i n fo rm a t io n ,  t h i s  s tudy  obse rves  companies f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e ­
ments to  determine i f  t h ey  r e f l e c t  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  a pens ion p la n .
Rat ios
Labor o r g a n i z a t i o n s  use accoun t ing  d a t a ,  in  the  form o f  f i n a n c i a l  
r a t i o s ,  t o  a s s e s s  th e  f i r m ' s  a b i l i t y  to  pay.  " F in a n c ia l  r a t i o s  de­
r iv e d  from the  f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n t s  o f  an employing f i rm  were f r e q u e n t l y  
mentioned in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  as  the  type  o f  accoun t ing  d a ta  which i s
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most use fu l  in measuring a b i l i t y  to  pay ." !
Ratio  a n a l y s i s  i s  a major  too l  f o r  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  "G e n e ra l ly ,  such a n a l y s i s  i n ­
vo lves  th e  breakdown o f  t h e  examined f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  in to  component 
p a r t s  which a r e  e v a lu a te d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  each o t h e r  and exogeneous
O
s t a n d a r d s . "  The e v a lu a t io n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  s ta t e m e n t s  in  th e  a n a l y s i s  
and dec is ion-m aking  p rocesses  can be exped i ted  by reduc ing  th e  l a r g e  
number o f  i tems found on f i n a n c i a l  s ta te m e n ts  to  key r a t i o s .  Ex­
amining a t i m e - s e r i e s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  i s  one way o f  an a ly z in g  th e  
d a t a .  " R a t i o s ,  r a t e s ,  and pe rcen tages  e x p e d i t e  th e  a n a l y s i s  by reducing  
th e  l a r g e  number o f  i tems involved to  a r e l a t i v e l y  small s e t  o f  r e a d i l y  
comprehended and economical ly  meaningful i n d i c a t o r s . "  No r a t i o ,  
t aken  a l o n e ,  i s  a meaningful number— comparisons must be made. "Rat io  
a n a l y s i s ,  which r e l a t e s  ba lance  s h e e t  and income s t a t e m e n t  i tems to 
one a n o t h e r ,  pe rm its  th e  c h a r t i n g  o f  a f i r m ' s  h i s t o r y  and th e  e v a lu a ­
t i o n  o.f i t s  p r e s e n t  p o s i t i o n . " ^
Finance l i t e r a t u r e  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  
i n t o  fou r  b a s ic  t y p e s .
1 .  L i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s , which measure t h e  f i r m ' s  
a b i l i t y  to meet i t s  m a tu r ing  s h o r t - t e r m  
o b i i g a t i o n s .
2. Leverage r a t i o s , which measure th e  e x t e n t  to  
which th e  f i rm  has been f inanced  by d e b t .
3 .  A c t i v i t y  r a t i o s , which measure how e f f e c t i v e l y  
th e  f i rm  i s  us ing  i t s  r e s o u r c e s .
4 .  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s , which measure management 's 
o v e r a l l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  as shown by th e  r e t u r n s
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gen e ra ted  on s a l e s  and Inves tm ent .
The a n a l y s i s  o f  a t o t a l  bus iness  would c e r t a i n l y  u t i l i z e  r a t i o s  from 
each o f  the  fundamental c l a s s e s .  However, in  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  the 
e f f e c t  o f  pension plan  a d o p t io n ,  l e v e ra g e  r a t i o s  a r e  n o t  r e l e v a n t .
The s i z e  o f  a f i r m ' s  o v e r a l l  d eb t  and th e  c o s t  o f  a pension plan a r e  
no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e l a t e d .  Company deb t  would be d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d ,  
when pension g r a n t in g  f irms  f in a n c e  t h e i r  p a s t  s e r v i c e  c o s t  with  
long- te rm  o b l i g a t i o n s .  However, t h e se  o b l i g a t i o n s  would most l i k e l y  
be long-term in n a t u r e .  Since t h i s  s tudy  examines t h e  s h o r t - t e rm  
e f f e c t s  o f  p en s io n s ,  l e v e ra g e  r a t i o s  a r e  not c o n s id e re d  in t h i s  r e ­
s e a rc h .
Tomczyk has l i s t e d  14 r a t i o s  which a r e  used by l a b o r  in  a s s e s s ­
ing an o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  a b i l i t y  to  pay l a b o r  b e n e f i t s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  wage 
i n c r e a s e s .  The r a t i o s  l i s t e d  cover  t h r e e  o f  t h e  b a s ic  f i n a n c i a l  
a r e a s :  (1) p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  (2) l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and (3) l i q u i d i t y .
Tomczyk r a t i o s ,  modif ied  f o r  t h i s  s tu d y ,  a r e  p re sen ted  in Table  I .
I f  pension b e n e f i t s  a re  cap tu red  in f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  the  b e n e f i t s  
should  be r ev e a le d  by th e s e  t h r e e  r a t i o  g roups .  Even though t h i s  l i s t  
o f  r a t i o s  was compiled with  th e  i n t e n t  o f  p r e d i c t i n g  a b i l i t y  t o  pay 
wage i n c r e a s e s ,  th e  r a t i o s  can be modified f o r  t h i s  s tu d y  to a t t e m p t  
t o  observe  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  pension p lans  on f i r m .
L i q u i d i t y . An e x t e n s iv e  l i q u i d i t y  a n a l y s i s  would r e q u i r e  more than 
t h e  examinat ion o f  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s .  However, " r a t i o  a n a l y s i s ,  by 
r e l a t i n g  th e  amount o f  cash and o t h e r  c u r r e n t  a s s e t s  t o  the  c u r r e n t
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TABLE I
THE RATIOS USED TO OBSERVE THE EFFECTS 
OF PENSION PLAN ADOPTION
P r o f i t a b i l i t y
■ k 1
Opera t ing  p r o f i t  to  s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i ty
Opera t ing  p r o f i t  to  t o t a l  a s s e t s *  1
Opera t ing  p r o f i t  to  n e t  s a l e s *  1
Net s a l e s  t o  t o t a l  a s s e t s
Cash flow to  s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i ty
Cash f low to  t o t a l  a s s e t s
Cash flow to  ne t  s ^ l e s
Earnings per  sh a re  2
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y
Opera t ing  expense^ [ i n c lu d in g  pension c o s t )  to  c o s t  
o f  goods so ld  3 
Operat ing  expense^ [ exc lud ing  pension c o s t )  to  c o s t  
o f  goods so ld  3 
Opera t ing  expenses ( in c lu d in g  pension c o s t )  t o  n e t  
s a l e s *  ^
Operat ing  expenses (exc lud ing  pension c o s t )  to  n e t  
s a l e s  3
Net s a l e s  to  s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y .
L iq u id i ty
Current  r a t i o  g 
Dividends per  sha re
* ^Tomczyk's s tudy  u t i l i z e d  n e t  e a r n i n g s .  This s tudy  w i l l  use 
o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  in o r d e r  to  reduce th e  in d iv id u a l  f irm e f f e c t  o f  
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  e v e n t s .  This p rocess  reduced Tomczyk's l i s t  by one r a t i o ,  
due to  h is  i n c l u s i o n  o f  “o p e r a t in g  p r o f i t  to  n e t  s a l e s "  in  th e  
o r i g i n a l  l i s t .
k p^
For purposes  o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  ea rn ings  per  sha re  w i l l  be 
pr imary and b e fo re  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  i tem s .
*  O
Tomczyk's s tudy  made no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between l a b o r  c o s t  
i n c lu d in g  o r  exc lud ing  pension c o s t .  This ad jus tm en t  in c r e a s e s  
Tomczyk's l i s t  by two r a t i o s .  "Opera t ing  expenses" was s u b s t i t u t e d  
f o r  l a b o r  c o s t  due to  t h e  l i m i t e d  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l a b o r  c o s t  d a t a .
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o b l i g a t i o n s ,  p rov ides  some quick and e a s y - t o - u s e  measures o f  
l i q u i d i t y . ' 17 The c u r r e n t  r a t i o  i s  used f o r  t h i s  purpose .  "A ccord ing ly ,  
a t t e n t i o n  i s  focused on the  s i z e  o f  th e  f i r m ' s  r e s e r v o i r  o f  l i q u i d
g
a s s e t s  r e l a t i v e  to  i t s  matur ing  l i a b i l i t i e s . "  Cash paid  to  company 
owners as  d iv idends  a l s o  a f f e c t s ,  and i s  a f f e c t e d  by ,  the  f i r m ' s  
l i q u i d i t y  p o s i t i o n .  Dividend payments may be a l t e r e d  o r  i n t e r r u p t e d  
by o t h e r  l a r g e  cash e x p e n d i tu r e s .  T h e re fo re ,  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s  c e r ­
t a i n l y  may be a f f e c t e d  by a pension plan  because o f  t h e  cash payments 
made by th e  company i n t o  i t s  pension fund.  Both o f  th e se  l i q u i d i t y  
measures w i l l  i n c r e a s e  in  s i z e  i f  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  pension plans 
improve th e  l i q u i d i t y  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  f i rm .
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y . A c t i v i t y  r a t i o s ,  sometimes denoted " e f f i c i e n c y
r a t i o s , "  examine v a r io u s  a s p e c t s  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  e f f i c i e n c y .  These
r a t i o s  focus on s p e c i f i c s  r a t h e r  than  the  o v e r a l l  e f f i c i e n c y  in d i c a t e d
9
by p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s .  R e la t io n s h ip s  o f  pension and o t h e r  l a b o r  
c o s t s  to  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  da ta  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  by c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t y  
r a t i o s .  These r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  a measure o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
Pension p lans  a re  f r e q u e n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  as  a r e s u l t  o f  employee 
demands. Pension plans  may a f f e c t  employee morale  and job  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  in  a d d i t i o n  to  lab o r  tu rn o v e r  and p r o d u c t i v i t y .  These f a c ­
t o r s  a r e  not  measured d i r e c t l y  by f i n a n c i a l  d a t a .  "The most widely  
used index o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  the  one which computes t h e  o u tp u t  per  
man-hour as  an ag g reg a te  i n d i c a t o r  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y  f o r  the  p r i v a t e
s e c t o r  o f  the  economy."^0 The i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s  to  measure 
pension plan e f f e c t s  on f i r m s '  f in a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  T h e re fo re ,  
c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  w i l l  be in c lu d ed  even though th e  r a t i o s  
may no t  be the  b e s t  measure o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
Irt h is  a t t e m p t  to  measure l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  Tomczyk used la b o r  
c o s t  as  th e  numerator  in  two o f  h is  r a t i o s .  Because o f  the  very  
l i m i t e d  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l a b o r  c o s t  da ta  from Tomczyk's in fo rm a t ion  
s o u rc e ,  h is  r a t i o  a n a l y s i s  c a r r i e s  l i t t l e  r e l i a b i l i t y .  This s tudy  
w i l l  s u b s t i t u t e  o p e r a t i n g  expenses fo r  l a b o r  c o s t  in  Tomczyk's r a t i o s  
"A p a r t  o f  any i n c r e a s e  in  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  in  the  s h o r t - r u n ,  may be 
r e f l e c t e d  in  a p r ic e  d e c l i n e ,  an i n c r e a s e  in  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t ,  and 
improvement in  th e  q u a l i t y  o f  p ro d u c ts ,  o r  a l l  o f  them .11 ^  " I t  i s  
no t  easy to  f in d  a measure o f  p roduc t  improvement,  but  f o r  p r i c in g  
d e c i s io n s  . . . ,  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t ,  and th e  r a t e  o f  c a p i t a l  inves tm ent
1 O
f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s  a re  good s o u r c e s . 11
Even though many ex t raneous  f a c t o r s  and in f lu e n c e s  a r e  p r e s e n t  
in “o p e r a t in g  expenses ,"  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  o p e r a t i n g  expense data  
was cons ide red  p r e f e r a b l e  to  th e  l i m i t e d l y  a v a i l a b l e  l a b o r  c o s t  d a t a .  
Fewer ex traneous  f a c t o r s  a re  p r e s e n t  in  o p e r a t i n g  expenses than  in 
t h e  o p e ra t in g  p r o f i t  d a ta  recommended by Horwitz and Shabahang. Both 
th e  Tomczyk s tudy  and th e  Horwitz and Shabahang s tudy  were concerned 
with  wages and a b i l i t y  to pay.  The ad jus tm en ts  made here to t h e i r  
recommended r a t i o s  a re  con s id e red  necessa ry  to  c a p tu re  th e  e f f e c t s  
o f  pension plans  on f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
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Four r a t i o s  used in  measuring lab o r  p r o d u c t iv i t y  i n c o r p o r a t e  
o p e r a t in g  expenses  in  th e  numera tor .  Two o f  t h e s e  r a t i o s  w i l l  inc lude  
pension c o s t  and two w i l l  exc lude  pension c o s t .  Two denominators w i l l  
be used;  each w i l l  have one numerator  o f  o p e r a t in g  expenses and one 
o f  o p e r a t i n g  expenses l e s s  pension c o s t .  The r a t i o s  us ing  c o s t  o f  
goods so ld  as  denominator  p rov ide  a measure o f  th e  r e l a t i v e  impor­
tance  o f  expenses t o  th e  t o t a l  c o s t s  o f  th e  products  s o l d .  S im i la r
1 ^r a t i o s  have been viewed as i n d i c a t o r s  o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  The 
r a t i o s  with  n e t  s a l e s  as  the  denominator a r e  a l s o  a measure o f  a 
f i r m ' s  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  The Horwitz and Shabahang s tudy used t h e i r  
o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  in  t h e  numerator o f  a r a t i o  with  n e t  s a l e s  as  the  
denominator  as a measure o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Because th e  numerators  o f  
each o f  t h e s e  r a t i o s  i s  an expense v a lu e ,  th e  sm a l le r  the  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
r a t i o ,  th e  g r e a t e r  t h e  p o s i t i v e  impact o f  th e  pension p l a n .
Net s a l e s  d iv ided  by s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i ty  i s  seen as a r e f l e c ­
t i o n  o f  the  f i r m ' s  revenue d e c i s io n s  and a c t i v i t i e s . ^  This  r a t i o  
w i l l  grow l a r g e r  i f  i t  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  . a f f e c t e d  by pension plan b eg in ­
n in g s .
P r o f i t a b i l i t y . Net income, o r  p r o f i t ,  i s  a goal o f  most bus iness  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  " P r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  a r e  designed fo r  t h e  e v a lu a t io n  
o f  the  f i r m ' s  o p e r a t i o n a l  performance.  The numerator o f  th e  r a t i o s  
c o n s i s t  o f  p e r i o d i c  p r o f i t s  acco rd ing  to  a s p e c i f i c  d e f i n i t i o n ,  while  
the  denominator r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e l e v a n t  inves tm ent  b ase .  The r a t i o s  
thus  y i e l d  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  th e  f i r m ' s  e f f i c i e n c y  in  us ing  th e  c a p i t a l
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committed by s to c k h o ld e r s  and l e n d e r s . " 1**
Three r a t i o s  in  t h i s  s tudy  use " o p e r a t in g  p r o f i t "  as a d e f i n i t i o n
o f  p e r i o d i c  p r o f i t s  as  t h e  numerator .  David Brown w ro te ,  "Since
p r o f i t s  a r e  th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  to  the  i n v e s t o r ,  th e  most meaningful
denominator f o r  most purposes i s  ne t  w or th .  Asse ts  a r e  probably
second b e s t  and s a l e s  t h i r d . " 1** While n e t  e a r n i n g s ,  u t i l i z e d  by
Tomczyk, may be a good i n d i c a t o r  o f  a b i l i t y  to  pay,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  items would d i s t o r t  any f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t  e f f e c t s  by
pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n .
Opera t ing  p r o f i t  d iv id e d  by s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i ty  i n d i c a t e s  the
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  th e  f i r m ' s  use o f  t h e  owners'  inves tm en t .  Brown wrote
t h a t  th e  most meaningful i n d i c a t o r  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  t h e  r a t i o  o f
1 7n e t  ea rn in g s  to  s tockho lde rs*  e q u i t y ,  based on th e  premise t h a t  th e  
duty o f  b u s in esses  i s  to  r e t u r n  p r o f i t s  on t h e i r  i n v e s t o r s '  c a p i t a l .
The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  measure o f  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  t o  t o t a l  a s s e t s  i s  
an i n d i c a t o r  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  in  t h e  use o f  company a s s e t s .  This r a t i o  
i s  im p o r tan t  because " .  . . i t  i s  presumed to  be b u i l t  on . . . both 
o p e r a t in g  and f i n a n c i a l  da ta  ( p r i m a r i l y  f lows)  as wel l  as f i n a n c i a l  
p o s i t i o n  ( s t o c k s ) . " 18
The r a t i o ,  o p e r a t i n g  p r o f i t  to  n e t  s a l e s ,  can be d e s c r ib e d  as 
"margin ."  I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  a measure o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  " .  . . 
margin r a i s e s  q u e r ie s  as  to  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  changing th e  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p  between revenues and expenses  by changing p r i c e s  an d /o r  
o p e r a t in g  c o s t s  per s a l e s  d o l l a r . " 1^ Zulauf  warns t h a t  us ing  the  
margin a lo n e  as a p r o f i t a b i l i t y  measure may be dangerous .  Zulauf
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examined Fortune 500 corpora t ions  and s t a t e s  t h a t  more than 9Q percent  
o f  these  companies had a h igher  r e tu rn  on investments than margin 
i n d i c a t e d . 20
. . . margin, as a s u b s t i t u t e  fo r  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n ,  i s  
su b jec t  to s i g n i f i c a n t  e r ro r  a t  the  indus t ry  l e v e l ,  
some e r r o r  in comparing companies within an in d u s t ry ,  
and poss ib le  e r ro r  in  the  firm both as to magnitude 
and d i r e c t i o n .  Therefore ,  In r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  and 
a b i l i t y  to pay de termina tions  margin should be used only 
as a supplementary tool  o f  a n a l y s i s . 21
He a l so  wrote ,  "Labor union l i t e r a t u r e  warns readers  o f  f in a n c ia l
s ta tements  t h a t  management o f ten  s t r e s s e s  margin because i t  i s  lower
77than r a t e  o f  r e tu rn  on investment.  ^
The r a t i o  o f  ne t  s a le s  to t o t a l  a s se t s  can be denoted as a s s e t  
tu rnover .  This p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o  i s  used f requen t ly  to measure 
how hard the  a s s e t s  are  worked to generate  the revenue fo r  the 
o rg a n iz a t io n .  Both Zualuf and Tomczyk recommend t h i s  turnover  r a t i o  
to  be used in conjunction with margin while ev a lua t ing  the company’s 
p rof i  t a b i l i t y .
Cash flow is  considered by many to be a form o f  l i q u i d i t y  a n a l y s i s .  
Lev wrote,
. . . the  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  the  l i q u i d  a s s e t s  r e s e r v o i r  
a t  a po in t  in time r e f l e c t s  only one aspec t  o f  the 
solvency s i t u a t i o n ;  ano the r ,  p o t e n t i a l l y  more impor­
t a n t ,  solvency aspec t  i s  the  ex ten t  o f  matching 
between per iod ic  cash inflows and outf lows.  The 
maintenance o f  adequate l i q u i d i t y  . . . obviously 
req u i re s  a c lose  matching or synchronizat ion o f  
cash flows. A general approach to  solvency evalua­
t i o n  should t h e r e fo re  cons ider  the r e l a t io n s h ip  
between cash inflows and outflows throughout  the  
pe r iod ,  as well as the  s iz e  o f  the e x i s t in g  l i q u id  
a s s e t  r e s e r v o i r . 23
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Because cash flow g e n e r a l ly  i s  n e t  ea rn ings  a d ju s te d  f o r  non-cash 
flows (most f r e q u e n t l y  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  d e p l e t i o n ,  and a m o r t i z a t i o n ) ,
"The cash f low f ig u r e  r e v e a l s  the  amount o f  o p e r a t i n g  cash a v a i l a b l e  
f o r  d iv idend  payments,  i n t e r n a l  f in a n c in g  o f  p l a n t  expans ion ,  and 
in c r e a s e s  in  working c a p i t a l . Z u l a u f  s t a t e d ,  "The success  the  
f i rm  i s  having in  meeting th ese  needs a r e  (SIC) o f  d i r e c t  importance
pC
i n  e s t im a t in g  th e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  f o r  th e  f u t u r e ,  . . . T h e re fo re ,  
based on th e se  th o u g h t s ,  cash flow i s  used as th e  numerator f o r  
t h r e e  r a t i o s  with the  same denominators  ( s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y ,  t o t a l  
a s s e t s ,  and n e t  s a l e s )  d i scu ssed  above u t i l i z i n g  o p e r a t in g  p r o f i t  as 
numera tor .  These cash flow r a t i o s  a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  as p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
measures .
Earnings per sh a re  i s  widely used in  e v a lu a t in g  c o rp o ra te  a c t i v i ­
t i e s .  " S t r a ig h t f o r w a r d ly  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  amount o f  
ea rn in g s  a l l o c a t e d  to one sha re  o f  common s to c k .  However, more im-
nc
por tance  i s  o f t e n  imputed to  t h i s  measure . . ." P r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  
p a s t  d e c i s io n s  can be e v a lu a ted  with  e a rn in g s  per  sha re  f i g u r e s .  Some 
a n a l y s t s  may use EPS da ta  as a base f o r  e s t im a t in g  d iv idends  o r  o t h e r  
f u t u r e  even ts  o f  a f i rm .  For purposes o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  e a rn in g s  per  
sha re  w i l l  be computed on primary ea rn ings  and b e fo re  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  
i terns.
" P r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  th e  n e t  r e s u l t  o f  a l a r g e  number o f  p o l i c i e s
71and d e c i s i o n s . "  The d e c i s io n  being s tu d i e d  in t h i s  o b s e rv a t io n  o f  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  i s  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a pension b e n e f i t  p l a n .  
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  should  in c lu d e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  both th e  pens ion
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expense and l a b o r ' s  p ro d u c t iv i ty .  Each o f  these  e ig h t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
r a t i o s  i s  s t ru c tu re d  to  increase  in value i f  i t  i s  p o s i t i v e ly  a f f e c te d  
by f i rm s '  i n s t i t u t i n g  pension plans fo r  t h e i r  employees.
Methodology. Since the  purpose o f  t h i s  s tudy i s  to  determine whether 
the  b e n e f i t s  from employee pension plans a re  observable in  f in a n c ia l  
s ta tement  in form at ion ,  each o f  the th re e  major c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  o f  
f in a n c ia l  r a t i o s  used in t h i s  study ( p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  labor  p ro d u c t iv i ty  
and l i q u i d i t y )  are expected to  improve a f t e r  the firms i n i t i a t e  pen­
sion p la n s .  Therefore ,  the null  hypothesis  fo r  t h i s  study i s :
Hq : There i s  no negat ive  e f f e c t  on f in a n c ia l  r a t i o s
a f t e r  firms i n i t i a t e  pension b e n e f i t  plans fo r  
t h e i r  employees.
The a l t e r n a t i v e  hypothesis  i s :
H^: Financia l  r a t i o s  in d ic a te  negat ive  e f f e c t s  a f t e r
firms i n i t i a t e  pension b e n e f i t  plans fo r  t h e i r  
employees.
The s p e c i f i c  methodology to  be used fo r  examining these  hypotheses i s  
d iscussed  thoroughly in Chapter i l l .
Summary
Pension plans r e q u i re  expendi tures  by firms which may p o t e n t i a l l y  
a f f e c t  labo r  turnover  and p ro d u c t iv i ty ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  company f in a n c ia l  
s ta tements  should be a f f e c t e d .  Ratio an a ly s is  i s  used in t h i s  study 
to  observe the e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n  on g ran t ing  f i rm s .  
Because r a t i o  a n a ly s is  r e l a t e s  balance sh ee t  and income s ta tement  data 
over a t ime s e r i e s ,  e f f e c t s  o f  ac t ions  taken within  the  time period 
considered can be ch ar ted .
The r a t i o s  used in  t h i s  study r ep re sen t  th re e  o f  the  bas ic
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c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  r a t i o  a n a l y s i s — p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y  ( a c t i v i t y ) ,  
and l i q u i d i t y .  L iq u i d i t y  r a t i o s  measure th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s  a b i l i t y  
to  meet i t s  c u r r e n t  o b l i g a t i o n s .  The c u r r e n t  r a t i o  and d iv idends  per  
s h a re  a re  used as l i q u i d i t y  measures .  L i q u i d i t y  i s  a f f e c t e d  by a 
pension plan because o f  th e  cash payments made by th e  company in to  
i t s  pens ion  fund.
R e la t io n s h ip s  o f  pension c o s t s  to  o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  data  a re  i n d i ­
c a te d  by c e r t a i n  a c t i v i t y  r a t i o s .  These r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  a measure 
o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Five r a t i o s  a r e  inc luded  as l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
m easures ;  they  a r e :  o p e r a t i n g  expenses ,  i n c lu d in g  and excluding
pension c o s t ,  d iv id e d  by c o s t  o f  goods s o l d ;  o p e r a t i n g  expenses ,  both 
i n c lu d in g  and exc lud ing  pension c o s t ,  d iv id ed  by n e t  s a l e s ;  and n e t  
s a l e s  d iv id ed  by s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y .  This s tudy  assumes pension 
p lans  a f f e c t  employee morale and job  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  as well  as l a b o r  
t u rn o v e r  and p r o d u c t i v i t y .  However, t h e s e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  w i l l  
be inc luded  even though th e  r a t i o s  may no t  be th e  b e s t  measure o f  
l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
Operat ing  p r o f i t  to  s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y ,  t o t a l  a s s e t s ,  and n e t  
s a l e s ;  n e t  s a l e s  to  t o t a l  a s s e t s ;  cash flow to  s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y ,  
t o t a l  a s s e t s ,  and n e t  s a l e s ;  and ea rn in g s  per  sh a re  a r e  the  e i g h t  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  measures  u t i l i z e d  to  observe  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension 
p l a n s .  These r a t i o s  a r e  measures  o f  t h e  o v e r a l l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the 
f i r m s .  Thus, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  should  in c lu d e  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  both 
th e  pension expense and l a b o r ' s  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
C o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  widely  used in  a n a ly z in g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f
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o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  Pension c o s t s  a r e  high and becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y  a 
major e x p e n d i tu re  o f  b u s in e s s e s .  Management would expec t  b e n e f i t s  
to  accrue  to  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  as a r e s u l t  o f  the  c o s t s  o f  funding pen­
s ion  b e n e f i t  p l a n s .  The o b j e c t i v e  o f  t h i s  s tudy  i s ,  with the  use o f  
accoun t ing  r a t i o s ,  to  observe th e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension p lans  on f i rm s '  
f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  Firms i n i t i a t i n g  pension b e n e f i t  p lans  f o r  
t h e i r  employees a re  th e  b a s i s  f o r  t h i s  a n a l y s i s .
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CHAPTER I I I
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
Managers,  and employees,  a re  aware o f  t h e  high c o s t  o f  pension 
p lans  and c o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  a widely  accep ted  p r a c t i c e .  The 
most obvious b e n e f i t  i s  to  th e  employees and t h e i r  r e t i r e m e n t  s e c u r i t y .  
A lso ,  because f irms i n c u r  th e  c o s t s  o f  q r a n t in g  pension b e n e f i t  p l a n s ,  
managements should  expec t  b e n e f i t s  t o  accrue  t o  t h e i r  f i rm s .  Using 
f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s ,  t h i s  s tudy  observes  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension p lan  
i n i t i a t i o n s  on o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .
Data C o l l e c t i o n
Much o f  th e  economic da ta  needed by company management and em­
ployees  to  a s s e s s  the  impact o f  c o r p o ra t e  d e c i s io n s  a r e  con ta ined  in 
t h e i r  f i r m ' s  f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  Account ing P r i n c i p l e s  Board 
Opinion,  No. 8 , which became e f f e c t i v e  in November 1966, governs the  
r e p o r t i n g  o f  pens ion c o s t  in fo rm a t ion  in f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  C e r ta in  
d i s c l o s u r e  requ i rem en ts  f o r  p r i v a t e  p lans  a r e  l i s t e d  in  th e  O pin ion .
The fo l low ing  d i s c l o s u r e s  should  be made acco rd ing  to  Opinion No. 8 :
1. A s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  such a p lan  e x i s t s ,  i d e n t i f y i n g  
or  d e s c r ib in g  th e  employee groups covered .
2 .  A s t a t e m e n t  o f  the  company's accoun t ing  and 
funding p o l i c i e s .
3. The p ro v is io n  f o r  pension c o s t  f o r  th e  p e r io d .
4 .  The e x c e s s ,  i f  any,  o f  t h e  a c t u a r i l l y  computed 
va lue  o f  v es te d  b e n e f i t s  over  t h e  t o t a l  o f  the  
pension fund and any ba lance  s h e e t  pension 
a c c r u a l s ,  l e s s  any pension repayments o r  de­
f e r r e d  ch a rg es .
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5. Nature and e f f e c t  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  m a t te r s  a f f e c t i n g  
c o m p a ra b i l i ty  f o r  a l l  p e r io d s  p r e s e n te d ,  such as  
changes in  accoun t ing  methods ( a c t u a r i a l  c o s t  method, 
a m o r t i z a t io n  o f  p a s t  and p r i o r  s e r v i c e  c o s t ,  t r e a t ­
ment o f  a c t u a r i a l  ga ins  and l o s s e s ,  e t c . ) ,  changes 
in  c i rcum stances  ( a c t u a r i a l  a ssum pt ions ,  e t c . ) ,  o r  
adopt ion  o r  amendment o f  a p l a n J
Relying on th e  t h i r d  d i s c l o s u r e  requ irem ent  from Opinion ,  No. 8 , 
the  sample s e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h i s  s tudy  was based on pension c o s t  d i s c lo s e d  
in  f i r m s ’ r e p o r t e d  income s t a t e m e n t s .  All da ta  were taken  from Standard  
& Poor’s Annual I n d u s t r i a l  F i l e  COMPUSTAT t a p e .  The sample was de­
te rmined  by examining t ime s e r i e s  o f  pension c o s t  data  f o r  m anufac tur ing  
f i rm s  and s e l e c t i n g  those  f irms  which began in c u r r i n g  pension c o s t  a f t e r  
no t  i n d i c a t i n g  t h i s  expense p r e v i o u s l y .  The y e a r  o f  p lan i n i t i a t i o n  
was de f ined  as  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  pension c o s t  da ta  appeared on th e  f i r m s '  
income s t a t e m e n t s .  Inc luded in  t h e  sample a re  a l l  f irms t h a t  have 
pens ion in fo rm a t io n  in t h e  p a t t e r n  d e sc r ib e d  above,  as well  as a l l  o t h e r  
necessa ry  da ta  to  be t e s t e d .  The d a ta  and d a te s  used in  t h i s  s tudy  
were v e r i f i e d  by comparisons with  th e  fo l low ing  two s o u rc e s :  Wall S t r e e t
Journa l  Index/Wall S t r e e t  Journal  and Moody's I n d u s t r i a l  Manual.
Ratio  Computations
In o rd e r  to  observe  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension p lan  i n i t i a t i o n s  on 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and any b e n e f i t s  o f  th e se  adop t ions  to  the  sampled f i r m s ,  
f i f t e e n  accoun t ing  r a t i o s  were computed. These r a t i o s  cover  t h r e e  bas ic  
f i n a n c i a l  a r e a s :  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and l i q u i d i t y .  The 
f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  used a re  p r e se n te d  in  Table I .  Ratio  a n a l y s i s  has been 
shown to  be u se fu l  in th e  e v a lu a t i o n  o f  f i rms  by l a b o r .  Chapter  I d i s ­
cusses  s ta t e m en ts  o f  v a r io u s  w r i t e r s  which imply t h a t  l a b o r  c o n s id e r s  the
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economic, as  well  as  th e  s o c i a l ,  impact o f  t h e i r  r e q u e s t s .  Much o f  
the  economic data  needed by managements and employees f o r  a s se s s in g  
th e  impact o f  co rp o ra te  d ec i s io n s  a re  con ta ined  in  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  
f in a n c i a l  s ta t e m e n t s .  This s tudy  uses f in a n c i a l  s ta tem en t  r a t i o s  to  
de termine the  e f f e c t s  o f  pens ions on companies beginning th ese  p lans .
Indus t ry  average r a t i o s  were a l so  computed fo r  each o f  the  
ind iv idua l  i n d u s t r i e s  rep re sen ted  in  the  sample o f  manufacturing f i rm s .  
I n d u s t r i e s  were determined by the  Standard I n d u s t r i a l  Code " tw o -d ig i t "  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  Every firm on the  COMPUSTAT tape  with a l l  th e  da ta  
necessary  f o r  the  r a t i o  computat ions ,  whether included in  the  sample 
group o r  no t ,  was inc luded in  i t s  in d u s t ry  average d e te rm in a t io n .  Each 
r a t i o ' s  in d u s t ry  average was computed as the  a r i t h m e t i c  mean o f  the  
r a t i o s  fo r  the  COMPUSTAT firms in  t h e i r  i n d u s t r y .  The in c lu s io n  o f  
non-sample-group f irms in  the in d u s t ry  average computations g ives  a 
broad-based and r e a l i s t i c  p r e s e n ta t i o n  o f  th e  ind iv idua l  i n d u s t r i e s '  
r a t i o  ave rages .  In d u s t ry  average r a t i o s  were computed fo r  each y ea r  
examined by t h i s  s tudy .
Every sample-group f i r m ' s  accounting r a t i o  u t i l i z e d  in t h i s  s tudy 
was s tan d a rd ized  by d iv id in g  th e  f i rm s '  r a t i o s  by th e  in d u s t ry  average 
o f  t h a t  r a t i o .  With t h i s  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n ,  any e f f e c t  on the  r a t i o  due 
to  the  sampled f irm being a member o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  in d u s t ry  i s  reduced— 
allowing o b se rv a t io n s  to  be made r e g a rd l e s s  o f  the  f i rm s '  i n d u s t ry  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
Company r a t i o s  a re  a f f e c t e d  by f in a n c i a l  events  s p e c i f i c  t o , t h e  
f i rm ,  as well as to  i t s  i n d u s t r y .  Even the  y e a r  and economy-wide
a c t i v i t i e s  w i l l  cause v a r i a t i o n s  in  company f in a n c i a l  r a t i o s .  These 
e f f e c t s  must be recogn ized  and cons ide red  i n  r a t i o  a n a l y s i s  methodology. 
This s tudy  c o n s id e rs  and a d j u s t s  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  
in  two ways.
F i r s t ,  t h e  s tudy  examines t h e  r a t i o s  over  a pe r iod  o f  t im e .  When 
observ ing  any r a t i o ' s  changes ,  t h e  e n t i r e  sample o f  manufactur ing  f irms 
was examined. The sampling procedure  al lowed companies to  be inc luded  
i f  t h e i r  pension c o s t s  were i n i t i a t e d  in  any y e a r  from 1967 ( th e  f i r s t  
y e a r  a f t e r  th e  requ irem ents  o f  Opin ion,  No. 8 ) through 1974 ( th e  y e a r  
o f  t h e  Pension Reform A c t ) .  S ince th e  y e a r  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n  
i s  th e  f o c a l - p o i n t  y e a r  f o r  a l l  sampled f i rm s  (no t  any i n d i v i d u a l ,  
s p e c i f i c  y ea r )  and s in c e  t h e  f irms  were always examined as a g roup ,  the  
non-pension r e l a t e d  e f f e c t s  were somewhat c a n c e l l e d ,  i . e . ,  "good" and 
"bad" e f f e c t s  on in d iv id u a l  f irms in th e  sample reduce each o t h e r .
The use o f  smoothing techn iques  i s  a very  e f f e c t i v e  method o f  
reducing  i n d i v i d u a l - f i r m  and economy-wide e f f e c t s .  This s tudy  i s  
p r im a r i l y  concerned with d e t e c t i n g  any s i g n i f i c a n t  r a t i o  v a r i a t i o n  due 
to  pension p lan  implementat ion while  ig n o r in g  o t h e r  v a r i a t i o n s .  Smooth­
ing t e c h n iq u e s ,  o f  t ime s e r i e s  d a t a ,  can accomplish  t h i s  g o a l .  S p r in g e r ,  
H e r l ih y ,  and Beggs s t a t e  t h a t  t h i s  goal can be o b ta in ed  by implementing 
" .  . . th e  most common smoothing method in  popular  u se ,  th e  moving
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a v e ra g e ."  In computing moving av e ra g e s ,  t h e  more v a lu es  used to  com­
pute  th e  av e rag e ,  the  more smoothing e x i s t s .  The fewer va lues  used ,  
t h e  more f l u c t u a t i o n s  and v a r i a t i o n s  a re  o b s e rv a b le .  S p r in g e r ,  H e r l ih y ,  
and Beggs f u r t h e r  s t a t e :
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. . . when th e  p rocess  I s  s u b je c t  to  change,  i t  i s  
d e s i r a b l e  to  use a . . . scheme t h a t  i s  more r e ­
sp o n s iv e ,  more s e n s i t i v e  to  the  d e t e c t i o n  o f  s i g n i ­
f i c a n t  s h i f t s .  In such cases  small va lu es  o f  ji a r e  
c a l l e d  f o r .  In any p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  va lue  i s  always a compromise between 
more smoothing to  reduce meaningless  v a r i a t i o n  and 
l e s s  smoothing to  reduce th e  time de lay  in  respond­
ing to  meaningful i n f o r m a t i o n . 3
A t h r e e - y e a r  moving-average was computed f o r  every  r a t i o  u t i l i z e d  
in t h i s  s tu d y .  Each r a t i o ' s  moving average  was de termined by computing 
th e  a r i t h m e t i c  mean o f  th e  i n d u s t r y - s t a n d a r d i z e d  r a t i o  f o r  one y e a r  
p lus  t h e  two immediate ly p reced ing  y e a r s .  These i n d u s t r y - s t a n d a r d i z e d ,  
moving-average,  r a t i o s  were c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  each sampled f i rm  f o r  t h e  ‘ 
y e a r s  1967 through 1977. This p rocess  r e q u i r e d  da ta  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  
r a t i o s  f o r  the  y e a r s  1965 th rough 1977. These a c t i v i t i e s  r e s u l t e d  in  
f i f t e e n  t i m e - s e r i e s  ( t h r e e - y e a r  moving-average)  i n d u s t r y - s t a n d a r d i z e d  
accoun t ing  r a t i o s .
The r e s u l t i n g  a d ju s t e d  average  r a t i o s  were p l o t t e d .  Each r a t i o ,  
f o r  each sampled company, was p l o t t e d  with  th e  y ea rs  1967 through 1977 
on th e  X-axis p o in t s  and moving-average v a lu es  on th e  Y-axis .  This 
p l o t t i n g  p rocess  eased th e  o b s e rv a t io n  o f  r a t i o  movements a c ro ss  th e  
t ime per iod  c o n s id e re d .  The y e a r  o f  pension p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  was i n d i ­
ca ted  on each p l o t ,  p e r m i t t i n g  an examination o f  r a t i o  v a r i a t i o n s  
p o s s ib ly  caused by th e  pension p l a n ' s  i n i t i a t i o n .  (See Appendix f o r  
examples o f  t h e  p l o t s . )
Rat io  Movements
Edward Deakin r e c e n t l y  s tu d i e d  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  accoun t ing
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r a t i o s  f o r  the  purpose o f  examining the  movements o f  f in a n c i a l  r a t i o s  
and th e  use o f  f in a n c i a l  r a t i o  data  in  s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s .  (Two o f  
Deakin 's  r a t i o s  a re  included in  t h i s  s tudy  and elements used in h is  
r a t i o  comparisons a re  a l so  used in computing the  r a t i o s  in  t h i s  s tu d y . )  
Deakin concluded t h a t  f in a n c i a l  r a t i o s  a r e  not normally  d i s t r i b u t e d .
He s t a t e s ,  "As.a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  i t  would appear  t h a t  assump­
t i o n s  o f  normali ty  f o r  f in a n c i a l  account ing  r a t i o s  would not  be t en ab le  
. . , " 4 The re fo re ,  t h i s  s tudy does no t  use param etr ic  s t a t i s t i c a l  
procedures in  observing the  e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan implementation on 
f i rm s '  account ing  r a t i o s .
To determine th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  i n i t i a t e d  pension plans  fo r  the  
o f f e r i n g  companies'  f in a n c ia l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  f i f t e e n  account ing  r a t i o s  
were p l o t t e d  and observed ac ross  t ime.  The f i f t e e n  r a t i o s  were grouped 
in to  the  th re e  b as ic  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t iv i t y ,  
and l i q u i d i t y .  The graphs o f  each company's r a t i o s  were grouped in to  
s ix  p o s s ib le  t r e n d  c a t e g o r i e s .  In o rde r  to  observe the  e f f e c t  o f  
pension plan i n i t i a t i o n  on the  moving-average o f  the  r a t i o s ,  th e se  s ix  
c a t e g o r i e s  a r e :
1. Upward t re n d  begun o r  inc reased
2.  Downward t re n d  begun o r  inc reased
3. S tab le  t rend  begun
(o r  r a t i o  began to  move with no d i s c e r n i b l e  t rend )
4.  Upward t rend  cont inued  a t  the  same r a t e
5. Downward t r e n d  cont inued a t  the  same r a t e
6. S t a b l e  t r e n d ,  o r  no d i s c e r n i b l e  t r e n d ,  continued
Figure 1 (page 43) i l l u s t r a t e s  the  p o s s ib le  movements o f  f in a n c i a l  r a t i o s .  
Movements which a re  cons idered  p o s i t i v e  and nega t ive  a re  i n d ic a te d  f o r  
each o f  the  t h r e e  p o s s ib le  d i r e c t i o n s .
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I N D I C A T E S  I M P R O V E M E N T  OR B E N I  F I T S  
EQUAL TO C O S T
I N D I C A T E S  BE N  I F I T S  L E S S  THAN C O S T S  
YEAR OF  P E N S I O N  P L A N  I N I T I A T I O N
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The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s '  e f f e c t s  can be i n t e r ­
pre ted s im i l a r l y .  A d i r e c t  b e n e f i t  to  the  o rgan iza t ion  i s  recognized 
with the beginning o f  an upward t rend  in the r a t i o s '  va lues ,  or  the 
beginning o f  a s t a b l e  (or  nondisce rn ib le)  t rend  a f t e r  a downward t rend  
in the va lues .  An i n d i r e c t  b e n e f i t  e x i s t s ,  o r  a t  l e a s t  support  e x i s t s  
fo r  the concept t h a t  b e n e f i t s  equal the  co s t  to the o rg a n iza t io n ,  when 
no nega t ive ,  or  dec reas ing ,  t rends  begin a f t e r  i n i t i a t i n g  a pension 
p lan .  On an o v e ra l l  b a s i s ,  the  c o s t - e q u a l s -b e n e f i t s  e f f e c t  i s  observed 
by the  con t inua t ion  o f  a t rend in  any d i r e c t i o n .  The negat ive  e f f e c t  
o f  pension plans i s  observed in the r a t i o s  by a downward t rend  begin­
ning or the lev e l in g  o f f  of  an upward t re n d .
in eva lua t ing  the  labor  p ro d u c t iv i ty  r a t i o s ,  the l a r g e r  the 
p ro d u c t iv i ty  r a t i o ,  the  g r e a t e r  the  negat ive  impact o f  the expense. 
Operating expense i s  the numerator in two o f  the r a t i o s  and opera t ing  
expense l e s s  pension expense i s  the  numerator in two. Therefore ,  the  
r a t i o  becomes l a r g e r  as the  expense in c re a se s .  The p o s i t iv e  and nega­
t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  these  four  r a t i o s  are  the  opposi te  o f  those  i l l u s t r a t e d  
in  Figure 1. The f i f t h  r a t i o  in the  labor  p ro d u c t iv i ty  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  
ne t  s a le s  to s to ck h o ld e r s '  e q u i ty ,  becomes l a r g e r  with improvement in 
p ro d u c t iv i ty .  In the  f i r s t  four r a t i o s ,  p o s i t i v e  b e n e f i t s  a re  in d ica ted  
by the beginning o f  a downward t rend  or  the  con t inua t ion  o f  a s t a b l e  
o r  a nond isce rn ib le  t r e n d .  Negative e f f e c t s  a re  in d ica ted  by the be­
ginning o f  an upward change in  the  r a t i o s '  t r e n d .  Support fo r  the 
b e n e f i t  concept e x i s t s  when no increas ing  trends  a re  begun a t  the  point  
o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n .  These con t inua t ion  t rends  through the
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y e a r  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  pension 
c o s t  would n o t  cause t h e  t o t a l  o f  o p e r a t i n g  expenses ,  and thus  t h e  
r a t i o s ,  to  i n c r e a s e .  T h e re fo re ,  c o s t  o f  th e  p lans  a r e ,  a t  l e a s t ,  
e q u a l l e d  by b e n e f i t s  to  th e  f i r m s .
Any movements in  the  f i f t h  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o  a r e  ana lyzed  in 
th e  same manner as were th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s .  This 
r a t i o ,  n e t  s a l e s  to  s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y ,  i n d i c a t e s  b e n e f i t s  to  the  
f irm with  i n c r e a s e s  in  the  r a t i o s '  s i z e .
The r a t i o s  a r e  analyzed  on a u n i v a r i a t e  b a s i s .  P revious  s tu d i e s  
have shown t h a t  each o f  t h e  accoun t ing  r a t i o s  a r e  o f  i n t e r e s t  in  
l a b o r  d i s c u s s i o n s .  Overa l l  b e n e f i t s ,  in th e  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a r e  
d e c la red  when a t  l e a s t  50 p e rce n t  o f  t h e  f i rm s  in  t h e  t e s t - g r o u p  show 
r a t i o s  i n d i c a t i n g  p o s i t i v e  f i n a n c i a l  e f f e c t s ,  i . e . ,  b e n e f i t s  a r e  
g r e a t e r  than  o r  equal to  th e  c o s t  o f  th e  pension p la n .
Matched-Pairs  Comparisons
Two a d d i t i o n a l  an a ly se s  were made. For t h e s e  comparisons ,  a p a i r  
o f  c o n t ro l  groups were s e l e c t e d  from th e  same t ime pe r iods  and indus ­
t r i e s  as th e  exper im enta l  group d i s cu s se d  e a r l i e r .  Control group one 
in c lu d e s  f irms w i thou t  pension p lans  f o r  the  t ime p e r io d  o f  th e  s tu d y .  
Control group two c o n ta in s  f irms i n d i c a t i n g  pens ion p lans  th roughout  
th e  e n t i r e  t ime per iod  examined. The comparisons o f  t h e  t e s t - g r o u p  
with  th e  two co n t ro l  groups help  to  dem onstra te  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  
r a t i o  changes f o r  f i rm s  moving from a s t a t e  o f  no pension plan  to  a 
s t a t e  w ith  a pension p la n .
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For a n a l y s i s  purposes ,  f i rm s  w i th o u t  pension plans  were matched 
with  th e  f i rms  from th e  o r i g i n a l  sample group.  The same matching p ro­
cess  was conducted between th e  o r i g i n a l  sample group,  which began 
pension plans  dur ing  th e  time pe r iod  examined, and con t ro l  group two, 
which had pension p lans  th roughou t  th e  same per iod  o f  t im e .  In both 
c a s e s ,  th e  matching process  tech n iq u e  was s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  used by
e
Beaver t o  p r e d i c t  f irm f a i l u r e s .  Beaver matched f i r m s ,  "from the  
same i n d u s t r y  and approx im ate ly  th e  same a s s e t  s i z e . "  6
The i n d u s t r i e s  f o r  the  two m a tch ed -p a i r  groups were determined 
by us ing  th e  S tandard  I n d u s t r i a l  Code " f o u r - d i g i t "  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
t e c h n iq u e .  Within th e  i n d u s t r y ,  f i rms were p a i r ed  by th e  amount o f  
t o t a l  a s s e t s .  The f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  f o r  t h e  two co n t ro l  groups were 
a l so  s t a n d a rd iz e d  by t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  average  and a t h r e e - y e a r  moving- 
average  was computed f o r  each r a t i o .
The r e f e r e n c e  p o in t  in th e  m a tch ed -p a i r s  comparison i s  th e  y e a r  
th e  f i rm  in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  sample i n i t i a t e d  i t s  pension p lan .  At t h a t  
p o in t  the  same o r i g i n a l  sample group t r e n d s  were observed f o r  the  con­
t r o l  groups .  This p rocess  i n d i c a t e s  whether  the  changes e x h i b i t e d  in 
th e  f i rm s  beginning p lans  a r e  a l s o  p r e s e n t  in  f irms  with and w i thou t  
p l a n s .  Rat io  v a r i a t i o n s  f o r  th e  companies in  t h e  o r i g i n a l  sample 
group a re  a t t r i b u t e d  to  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n  when s i m i l a r  v a r i a t i o n s  
a r e  not  p r e s e n t  in  i t s  two m atched -pa i r  companies .  A c h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  
f o r  two independent  samples i s  u t i l i z e d  to  determine th e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
between the  t e s t - g r o u p  f i r m s '  r a t i o s  and each o f  t h e  two co n t ro l  
g ro u p 's  r a t i o s .
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Pension Plan Termination
No t e s t s  a r e  made in  t h i s  s tudy  to  de termine  th e  e f f e c t  o f  pension 
plan t e r m i n a t i o n s .  In th e  m id -1 9 7 0 ' s ,  many companies a c t u a l l y  d id  
t e r m in a t e  t h e i r  pension b e n e f i t  p l a n s .  This  a c t i o n  was p o s s ib ly  a 
r e s u l t  o f  r equ irem ents  s e t  f o r t h  in  th e  Pension Reform Act o f  1974.
In th e  f i r s t  f i v e  months fo l low ing  th e  e f f e c t i v e  d a te  o f  t h e  Pension 
Reform Act ,  4 ,000 n o t i c e s  o f  t e rm in a t io n  were f i l e d  with  t h e  Pension 
B e n e f i t  Guarantee C o rp o ra t io n .^
Two reasons  e x i s t  f o r  not t e s t i n g  the  p o s s ib l e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension 
p lan  t e r m i n a t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  th e  t e rm in a te d  p r i v a t e  pension plan 
i s  p o s s ib ly  r e p la ce d  by some o t h e r ,  compensat ing,  employee b e n e f i t .
This a c t i o n  could cancel  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  decreased  b e n e f i t s .  Second, 
th e  massive t e r m in a t io n  o f  p lans  in  th e  mid 1970 's  r e s u l t e d  i n  l i t t l e  
p ub l i shed  accoun t ing  data  being a v a i l a b l e  f o r  t e s t i n g .
Summa ry
Data f o r  d e te rm in ing  whether  b e n e f i t s  a r e  o b se rv a b le  in  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta te m e n ts  were c o l l e c t e d  from Standard  & Poor 's  COMPUSTAT t a p e .  APB 
Opinion,  No. 8 r e q u i r e s  t h a t  p lans  be d i s c lo s e d  a long  with  t h e  p r o v i ­
s i o n ,  f o r  the  p e r io d ,  o f  any pension c o s t .  All COMPUSTAT m anufac tur ing  
companies which began r e p o r t i n g  pension expense on t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  
s ta te m e n ts  between 1967 and 1974 were in c lu d ed  in  t h i s  s tu d y .
F i f t e e n  accoun t ing  r a t i o s  were computed in  o rd e r  to  observe th e  
e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n s  on th e  sampled f i r m s '  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s .  The accoun t ing  r a t i o s  u t i l i z e d  in t h i s  s tudy  were s t a n ­
d a rd ized  by d iv id in g  th e  in d iv id u a l  f i r m s '  r a t i o s  by computed i n d u s t r y
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averages  o f  th e  r a t i o s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  a t h r e e - y e a r  moving-average 
was computed f o r  each r a t i o  u t i l i z e d  in  t h i s  s tu d y .  These smoothing 
techn iques  a r e  used to  i s o l a t e  th e  r a t i o  v a r i a t i o n s  caused by pension 
plan im plem enta t ion .  The r a t i o s  used cover  t h r e e  b a s ic  f i n a n c i a l  
a r e a s :  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and l i q u i d i t y .
The s ta n d a rd iz e d  average  r a t i o s  were p l o t t e d  f o r  each sampled 
f i r m ,  to  observe  r a t i o  v a r i a t i o n s  caused by i n i t i a t i n g  a pension p la n .  
These p lo t s  were t r a c e d  a c ro ss  th e  y e a r  o f  p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  and grouped 
i n t o  s i x  b as ic  c l a s s e s — upward t re n d  begun, downward t r e n d  begun, a 
l e v e l i n g  (o r  n o n d i s c e rn ib l e )  t r e n d  begun, upward t r e n d  c o n t in u e d ,  
downward t ren d  c o n t in u e d ,  and a l e v e l  (o r  n o n d i s c e rn ib l e )  t r e n d  con­
t i n u e d .  This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  process  was used to  determine th e  r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p s  between pension p lan  c o s t  and i t s  b e n e f i t s  to  t h e  o f f e r i n g  
f  i rm.
A o n e - to -o n e  comparison was made a c ro s s  th e se  same time p e r iods
with  m a tched -pa i rs  o f  f i rms  n o t  having pension p lans  and with  matched-
p a i r s  o f  f irms which had pens ion p lans  th roughou t  th e  t ime per iod  o f  
th e  s tu d y .  The m a tch ed -p a i r s  o f  th e  two groups were s e l e c t e d  by t h e i r  
in d u s t r y  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and a s s e t  s i z e .  Rat io  v a r i a t i o n s  in  o r i g i n a l  
sample group companies a r e  a t t r i b u t e d  to  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n s  when 
s i m i l a r  v a r i a t i o n s  were not p r e s e n t  i n  i t s  two m a tch ed -p a i r  companies.
A u n i v a r i a t e  a n a l y s i s  i s  used in  t h i s  s tu d y .  The s tudy  does no t
group r a t i o s  to  de termine  i f  b e n e f i t s  a r e  p r e s e n t  in  v a r io u s  r a t i o  
com bina t ions ,  nor  a r e  t e s t s  conducted to  de te rm ine  th e  e f f e c t  o f  pension 
plan te rm in a t io n  on companies.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
F i f t e e n  accoun t ing  r a t i o s  were computed from f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e ­
ment d a ta  c o l l e c t e d  from S tandard  & P o o r ' s  COMPUSTAT t a p e .  Three- 
y e a r  moving-averages  o f  i n d u s t r y - s t a n d a r d i z e d  r a t i o s  were p l o t t e d  over  
t h e  time pe r iod  beginning  in  1967 and ending in  1977. The purpose o f  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  i s  to  observe the  e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n s  on 
m anufac tu r ing  companies .  These r a t i o s  cover  t h r e e  b as ic  f i n a n c i a l  
a r e a s :  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and l i q u i d i t y .  The manu­
f a c t u r i n g  f irms in  t h i s  sample were matched with  two m a tch ed -p a i r s  
sample groups— th o se  having pension p lans  and th o se  no t  having p l a n s .  
The m a tch e d -p a i r s  in  th e  two groups were s e l e c t e d  by t h e i r  i n d u s t r y  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and t o t a l  a s s e t  s i z e .
S e l e c t io n  o f  th e  Samples
Opinion,  No. 8 r e q u i r e s  annual pension c o s t  in fo rm a t io n  to  be 
d i s c l o s e d  in  th e  firms* f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  The o r i g i n a l  t e s t - g r o u p  
sample was s e l e c t e d  from th o se  companies which began r e p o r t i n g  pension 
c o s t  a f t e r  not  i n d i c a t i n g  the  expense p r e v i o u s l y .  Two c o n t ro l  groups 
were a l s o  s e l e c t e d .  Control group one in c lu d e s  manufac tur ing  f irms 
no t  r e p o r t i n g  pension c o s t s  dur ing  the  time pe r iod  o f  t h i s  s tu d y .  
Control group two was s e l e c t e d  from m anufac tur ing  f irms r e p o r t i n g  
pension p lan  c o s t  th roughout  the  time p e r io d  examined. All CUMPUSTAT
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m anufac tur ing  f irms  t h a t  have pension in fo rm a t io n  in  t h e  p a t t e r n s  
d e s c r ib e d  above,  and a l l  o t h e r  da ta  necessa ry  to  compute th e  r a t i o s  
d iscu s sed  in  Chapter  I I ,  a r e  inc luded  in the  t h r e e  sample groups.
This  s e l e c t i o n  p rocess  r e s u l t e d  in  67 f irms being inc luded  in the  
sample r e p r e s e n t i n g  pension plan i n i t i a t i n g  companies.  Control group 
one ,  f i rm s  w i th o u t  p l a n s ,  had 27 f irms  and co n t ro l  group two, f i rm s  
w ith  p l a n s ,  inc luded  62 companies .  The f irms in  t h e  t e s t - g r o u p  and 
t h e i r  m a tched-pa i r s  in  t h e  two con t ro l  groups a re  l i s t e d  in  the  
Appendix.
The y e a r  o f  plan  i n i t i a t i o n  was de f in ed  as  th e  f i r s t  y e a r  pension 
d a ta  appeared on th e  t e s t - g r o u p  f i r m s '  pub l i shed  income s t a t e m e n t s .  
These same y e a r s  were used to  observe  t r e n d s  in t h e  r a t i o s  o f  th e  two 
m a tched -pa i r s  c o n t ro l  groups .  Data were c o l l e c t e d  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1967 
through 1974. However, no f irms  were inc luded  i f  t h e i r  pens ion plans  
were s t a r t e d  in  1967 o r  1968. This procedure  a l lowed f o r  o b s e rv a t io n  
o f  t r e n d s  befo re  t h e  y e a r  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n .  Table I I  l i s t s  
by y e a r  t h e  number o f  sampled f irms beginning  pension p lans  in  each 
o f  th e  y e a r s  1969 through 1974.
When obse rv ing  r a t i o  changes o r  t r e n d s ,  the  e n t i r e  sample o f  
manufac tur ing  f irms  i n i t i a t i n g  pension p lans  was examined as one group. 
This p rocess  e f f e c t i v e l y  d e s ig n a te d  th e  y e a r  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n  
as  y e a r  "0" w ith  y ea rs  a f t e r  being 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  e t c .  and y e a r s  befo re  being 
- 1 ,  - 2 ,  e t c .  The same p rocess  was used with  both c o n t ro l  g roups .  The 
p o s i t i v e  and n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t s  o f  economic even ts  o r  t r e n d s  o f  s p e c i f i c  
y e a r s  a r e  reduced by us ing  the  y e a r  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n
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as  the  f o c a l - p o i n t  y e a r  f o r  a l l  t h e  sampled f i rm s .
TABLE I I
THE NUMBER OF SAMPLED FIRMS INITIATING 
PENSION PLANS BY YEAR








Movement o f  t h e  Rat ios
Graphs o f  each company's moving-average r a t i o s  were grouped in to  
s i x  t r e n d  c a t e g o r i e s  in  o rd e r  to  observe  th e  e f f e c t s ,  a t  th e  time o f  
p lan  i n i t i a t i o n ,  on f i r m s '  p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and 
l i q u i d i t y .  A sample o f  th e  graphs o f  r a t i o s  i s  inc luded  in the  
Appendix. The c a t e g o r i e s  o f  t r e n d s  and th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  v a r ious  
r a t i o s  being grouped i n t o  the  t r e n d  groupings  were d isc u s se d  in  
Chapter I I I .  The s ix  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  r a t i o  movements a r e :
1 .  Upward t r e n d  begun o r  in c r e a se d
2 .  Downward t r e n d  begun o r  in c re a se d
3.  S ta b le  t r e n d  begun
(or  r a t i o  began to  move with  no d i s c e r n i b l e  t r e n d )
4 .  Upward t r e n d  cont inued a t  th e  same r a t e
5 .  Downward t r e n d  cont inued  a t  th e  same r a t e
6 .  S t a b l e  t r e n d ,  o r  no d i s c e r n i b l e  t r e n d ,  con t inued
P o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n s  a r e  observed in each
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o f  th e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s ,  as well  as  t h e  n e t  s a l e s /  
s to c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y  r a t i o  in  the  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  c l a s s ,  by an 
upward t r e n d  beg inn ing ,  c o n t in u in g ,  o r  i n c r e a s i n g ;  a downward t r e n d  
c o n t in u in g  a t  t h e  same o r  d ec reas in g  r a t e ;  o r  a l e v e l ,  o r  n o n d i s c e r n ib l e ,  
t r e n d  c o n t in u in g .  A n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t  i s  observed in  t h e se  r a t i o s  by 
th e  beginning o f  a downward t r e n d ,  a d ec rease  in  an upward t r e n d ,  o r  
th e  beginning  o f  a f l a t ,  o r  n o n d i s c e r n i b l e ,  t r e n d  a f t e r  an upward 
t r e n d .  The e x i s t e n c e  o f  " con t inu ing"  t r e n d s  a c ro ss  the  time o f  pension 
p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  i s  t r e a t e d  as  n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor  a n e g a t iv e  move­
ment.  For th e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t iv i t y  r a t i o s ,  with t h e  excep t ion  o f  n e t  
s a l e s / s t o c k h o l d e r s '  e q u i t y ,  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  a r e  observed with t h e  
beginning  o f  a downward t r e n d ,  a d ec rease  in  an upward t r e n d ,  o r  no 
change in  th e  t r e n d .  Negative e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n s  
a re  ohserved by an upward t r e n d  beg inn ing ,  or  i n c r e a s i n g ,  o r  a downward 
t r e n d  d e c r e a s in g .  As with p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s ,  th e  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  as one o f  th e  t h r e e  
"co n t in u in g "  t r e n d s  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor a n e g a t iv e  
movement. This " n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor n eg a t iv e "  movement i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  c o s t  e q u a l le d  b e n e f i t s  in  the  pension i n i t i a t i n g  f i rm .
The Tes t -Group . The r e s u l t s  o f  p l o t t i n g  th e  t e s t - g r o u p  a re  p re sen ted  
in Table I I I .  E igh t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  were observed a c ro ss  th e  
y e a r  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n  f o r  67 manufac tur ing  f i r m s .  For the 
536 p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  examined, 141 were d es ig n a te d  as  i l l u s t r a t i n g  
p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s ;  97 i n d i c a t e d  n ega t ive  e f f e c t s ;  and 298 r a t i o s  i n d i -  
c a te d  n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  on p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  Five
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TABLE I I I
THE EFFECTS OF PENSION PLAN INITIATION ON THE 
RATIOS OF THE TEST-GROUP FIRMS
P o s i t i v e
E f f e c t s
Negative
E f f e c t s
N e i th e r  P o s i t i v e  
nor  Negat ive 
Movements T o ta ls
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  Rat ios
Number 141 97 298 536
P ercen t 26% 19% 55% 100%
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  Rat ios  
Number 80 67 188 335
P ercen t 24% 20% 56% 100%
L iq u i d i t y  Rat ios
Number 32 18 84 134
Percen t 24% 13% 63% 100%
la b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  per  f i rm  r e s u l t e d  in  335 r a t i o s  being o bse rved .
Eighty  i n d i c a t e d  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s ;  67 i n d i c a t e d  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s ;  and 
188 r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  fo l low ing  
th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  th e  pens ion  p l a n .  Two l i q u i d i t y  measures were com­
puted f o r  th e  67 m anufac tu r ing  f irms in  t h e  t e s t - g r o u p .  Of th e se  134 
r a t i o s ,  32 showed p o s i t i v e  movements, 18 i n d i c a t e d  n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t s ,  
and 84 o f  th e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  on 
th e se  f i r m s '  l i q u i d i t y .
The.same p a t t e r n  o f  e f f e c t s  i s  p r e s e n t  in each o f  t h e  t h r e e  r a t i o  
g roup ings .  The p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  in about  o n e - fo u r th  o f
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the  cases  and n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  in  o n e - f i f t h  o r  l e s s  o f  t h e  c a s e s .  In 
a l l  o f  t h e  t h r e e  r a t i o  c l a s s e s  t h e  t h i r d  group o f  e f f e c t s —n e i t h e r  
p o s i t i v e  nor n e g a t i v e — i s  i n d i c a t e d  in  over  o n e - h a l f  o f  t h e  c a s e s .  The 
15 r a t i o s  f o r  a l l  t h r e e  sample groups a r e  l i s t e d  in  th e  Appendix w i th  
t h e  number o f  p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t iv e ,  and " n e i t h e r "  movements i n d i c a t e d  f o r  
each r a t i o .
Three o f  th e  e i g h t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  were "cash flow" r a t i o s .  
These t h r e e  r a t i o s  u t i l i z e d  th e  same denominators  as  t h e  t h r e e  " o p e r a t in g  
p r o f i t "  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s .  No c o n s i s t e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  were observed 
over  t ime between the  two s e t s  o f  r a t i o s .
Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  were computed so t h a t  two inc luded  
pension c o s t  in t h e  numerator  and two excluded pension c o s t .  C o n s i s t e n t l y ,  
th e  graphs o f  the  r a t i o s  exc lud ing  pension c o s t  p a r a l l e l e d  t h e  move­
ments o f  th e  two r a t i o s  in c lu d in g  th e  c o s t .  No s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
i s  o b se rv ab le  in th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e se  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  com puta t ions .
The Control  Groups. The r e s u l t s  f o r  co n t ro l  group one a r e  p re sen te d  in 
Table IV. The 27 companies in  con t ro l  group, one had 48 o f  th e  p r o f i t ­
a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t i n g  p o s i t i v e  movements and 40 i n d i c a t i n g  nega­
t i v e .  Over th e  same p e r i o d ,  128 p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  n e i t h e r  
p o s i t i v e  nor n e g a t iv e  r a t i o  movements. In examining t h e  54 l i q u i d i t y  
r a t i o s  f o r  c o n t ro l  group one f i r m s ,  14 d i sp la y e d  p o s i t i v e  movements,  7 
d i sp la y e d  n e g a t iv e  r a t i o  movements, and 33 demonstra ted n e i t h e r  a 
p o s i t i v e  nor  a n e g a t iv e  t r e n d .  A somewhat d i f f e r e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  
seen when th e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  were c a l c u l a t e d .  Twenty-one 
r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  p o s i t i v e  t r e n d s ,  whi le  40 o f  t h e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d
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TABLE IV
THE OBSERVED EFFECTS ON THE TWO CONTROL GROUPS 
AFTER THE TEST-GROUP FIRMS INITIATE 
PENSION PLANS
Control Group One 
(w i thou t  pension p lans)
N e i th e r  P o s i t i v e  
P o s i t i v e  Negat ive  nor Negative  
E f f e c t s  E f f e c t s  Movements
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  Rat ios
Number 48 40 128
Percen t  22% 19% 59%
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  Rat ios
Number 21 40 .74
Percen t  15% 30% 55%
L i q u i d i t y  Ratios
Number 14 7 33
P e rc e n t  26% 13% 61%
Control Group Two 
(with  pension p lan s )
N e i th e r  P o s i t i v e
P o s i t i v e  Negative nor Negat ive 
E f f e c t s  E f f e c t s  Movements
P r o f i t a b i  l i t y  Rat ios
Number 126 88 282
P ercen t  25% 18% 57%
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  Ratios
Number 58 50 202
P ercen t  19% 16% 65%
L i q u i d i t y  Rat ios
Number 37 27 60
Pe rc en t  30% 22% 48%















n e g a t iv e  t r e n d s ,  and 74 showed t r e n d s  n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor  n e g a t iv e  
in  d i r e c t i o n .  This i s  th e  on ly  case  where th e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  more 
n e g a t iv e  than  p o s i t i v e  r a t i o  movements.
The r e s u l t s  o f  c o n t ro l  group two r a t i o s  a r e  p re sen ted  in Table 
IV. All o f  t h e  r a t i o  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  and comparisons in  c o n t ro l  group 
two i n d i c a t e d  th e  same p a t t e r n  as did the  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s .  Con­
t r o l  group two was comprised o f  62 manufactur ing  companies.  Of the  
e i g h t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s ,  p o s i t i v e  r a t i o  movements were p r e s e n t  in 
126 o f  t h e  c a l c u l a t e d  r a t i o s ;  88 o f  th e se  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  n eg a t iv e  
movements; and 282 o f  the  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor a 
n e g a t iv e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  t r e n d .  Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y  f o r  c o n t ro l  group 
two was observed with  a t o t a l  o f  310 r a t i o s ;  58 o f  t h e se  i n d i c a t e d  
p o s i t i v e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  t r e n d s ;  50 in d i c a t e d  neg a t iv e  t r e n d s ;  and 202 
n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor n eg a t iv e  movements. For th e  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s  {124 
r a t i o s ) ,  37 showed p o s i t i v e  t r e n d s ,  27 showed n e g a t i v e ,  and 60 i n d i c a t e d  
n e i t h e r .  The t r e n d  p a t t e r n s  a r e  p re sen ted  in th e  Appendix f o r  the  
t e s t - g r o u p ,  co n t ro l  group one ,  and co n t ro l  group two f o r  each o f  the  
15 r a t i o s .
The two co n t ro l  groups i n d i c a t e d  movements s i m i l a r  to  t h e  t e s t -  
group.  Table V d i s p l a y s  th e  c h i - s q u a r e  v a lu es  r e s u l t i n g  from examining 
t h e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between the  t e s t - g r o u p  and both o f  th e  co n t ro l  groups.
A c h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  f o r  two independent  samples was conducted to  determine 
i f  the  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s '  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from th o se  o f  co n t ro l  group one and con t ro l  group two.  The t e s t  
h y po thes is  i s :
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H : There is_no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e re n c e  in the  move- 
0 ments o f  the  r a t i o s  between the t e s t -g ro u p  and
each o f  the control  groups.
The a l t e r n a t i v e  hypothesis  i s :
H-: The t e s t -g ro u p  r a t i o  movements a re  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
u d i f f e r e n t  from the r a t i o  movements in  each o f
the  control groups.
TABLE V
CHI-SQUARE VALUES INDICATING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE 
TEST-GROUP AND THE CONTROL GROUPS
Test-Group to Control Group One
Ratio
C la s s i f i c a t i o n Chi-Square Value
P r o f i t a b i l  i t y  
Labor P ro d u c t iv i ty  




Test-Group to Control Group Two
Ratio
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Chi-Square Value
Profi t a b i l  i t y  
Labor P roduc t iv i ty  




The ch i- square  c r i t i c a l  value a t  the  .05 leve l  i s  5.99
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Since  a l l  o f  th e  c h i - sq u a re  v a lu es  a r e  l e s s  than th e  c r i t i c a l  
v a lu e ,  a t  the  .05 l e v e l ,  t h e r e  appears  to  be no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
between the  movements o f  t h e  r a t i o s  f o r  th e  t e s t - g r o u p  and each o f  th e  
c o n t ro l  groups.
P a i r i n g  o f  th e  Samples
Conclusions concern ing  th e  r e s u l t s  r e p o r te d  in  t h e  prev ious  sec ­
t i o n  can on ly  be con s id e red  a f t e r  th e  t e s t - g r o u p  f irms  have been pa i red  
with  companies in  the  two co n t ro l  g roups .  When r a t i o  t r e n d s  change 
in  t h e  t e s t - g r o u p ,  th e  change i s  on ly  cons ide red  a r e s u l t  o f  pension 
plan i n i t i a t i o n  i f  th e  r a t i o  does n o t  change in  t h e  same manner as i t s  
m a tc h e d -p a i r .  As d i scu s sed  in  Chapter I I I ,  matching was based on 
i n d u s t r y  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and t o t a l  a s s e t s .
Table VI c o n ta in s  th e  percen tages  in  each o f  th e  r a t i o  c l a s s i f i c a ­
t i o n s  i n d i c a t i n g  p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e ,  or  n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor  n eg a t iv e
movements f o r  a l l  t h r e e  groups.
Control Group One. The m a tch ed -p a i r  comparisons r e s u l t e d  in 27 matched-
p a i r  f i rms from th e  t e s t - g r o u p  and co n t ro l  group one.  The r a t i o s  o f  
th e  m a tch ed -p a i r  f i rms showed s i m i l a r  t r e n d s  f o r  26 p e r c e n t  o f  th e  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s ,  23 pe rc e n t  o f  th e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s ,  and 
35 p e rc e n t  o f  th e  l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s .  S im i la r  t re n d s  a r e  con s id e red  to 
e x i s t  when the  c o n t ro l  groups '  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e  t h e  t r e n d  c o n t in u in g  or  
a d i f f e r e n t  t r e n d  beginning  a t  the  same t ime th e  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s  
i n d i c a t e d  t h e s e  same r e s p e c t i v e  movements.
However, the  above p e rcen tag es  in c lu d e  th e  "co n t in u in g "  t r e n d s
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TABLE VI
THE PERCENTAGE EFFECTS ON THE TEST-GROUP AND THE TWO 
CONTROL GROUPS AFTER THE TEST-GROUP FIRMS 
INITIATE PENSION PLANS
N ei th e r  P o s i t i v e  
P o s i t i v e  Negat ive nor Negat ive 
E f f e c t s  E f f e c t s  Movements T o ta l s
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  Ratios
Test-Group 26% 19% 55% 100%
Control Group One 22% 19% 59% 100%
Control Group Two 25% 18% 57% 1 * '"
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  Rat ios
Test-Group 24% 20% 56% 100%
Control Group One 15% 30% 55% 100%
Control  Group Two 19% 16% 65% 100%
L i q u id i ty  Rat ios
Test-Group 24% 13% 63% 100%
Control Group One 26% 13% 61% 100%
Control Group Two 30% 22% 48% 100%
throughou t  th e  time p e r io d .  A "con t inu ing"  t r e n d  i s  one where t h e r e  has
been no change dur ing  the  time per iod  examined. When r a t i o s  c o n t in u e  t h e i r
t r e n d s  a c ro ss  th e  t ime o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n ,  no e f f e c t s  o f  pension
plan  can be observed .  The percen tages  o f  s i m i l a r i t i e s  f a l l  when the
"co n t in u in g "  t ren d s  a re  removed from c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The r e s u l t i n g
percen tages  a r e :
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  6 p e rce n t
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  4 p e r c e n t
L i q u id i ty  11 p e rc e n t
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The f ig u re s  r e p re s e n t  the  percentages  o f  s im i l a r  t rends  between the 
t e s t -g ro u p  and control  group one a f t e r  the  t e s t -g ro u p  f irms began 
t h e i r  pension p lans .  Because each o f  these  percentages i s  small,  
changes in  t re nds  o f  the  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s  are  cons idered to be 
caused by f a c to r s  not a f f e c t i n g  the  companies making up control group 
one.
Control Group Two. Sixty-two companies were s e le c ted  as matched-pairs  
f o r  f irms in  the  t e s t - g r o u p .  Each o f  these  companies' f in a n c ia l  s t a t e ­
ments in d ica te d  pension co s t  fo r  the e n t i r e  period o f  t h i s  s tudy.  The 
r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  p a i r in g  a re  very s im i la r  to the  p a i r in g  with control 
group one. R a t io s ,  which continue t h e i r  t rends  across  the  time o f  
pension plan i n i t i a t i o n ,  i n d i c a t e  no observable  e f f e c t s  of  pension plan 
i n i t i a t i o n s .  The percentages  o f  s i m i l a r i t i e s  decrease  when the  "con­
t inu ing"  trends  are  removed from c o n s id e ra t io n .  The percentages  a f t e r  
removing the "continuing" t rends  a r e :
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  7 percent
Labor P ro d u c t iv i ty  4 percent
L iqu id i ty  6 percent
Each o f  these  percentages are  sm al l ,  as was the case with control  group
one; t h e r e fo r e , ,  the  o r ig in a l  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  r a t i o s '  t rends  a re  cons idered 
to  be caused by f a c to r s  o th e r  than those a f f e c t i n g  the  companies i n ­
cluded in control  group two.
Summary
Sixty-seven manufacturing firms i n i t i a t i n g  pension plans  between 
1969 and 1974 were included in the  t e s t -g ro u p  sample. For each o f  the
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t h r e e  r a t i o  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s — p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and 
1 i 'q u id i ty —more than 80 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  no 
n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t  was a p p a re n t  a f t e r  t h e  f i r m s '  y e a r  o f  pens ion p lan  be­
g in n in g .  The c h i - s q u a r e  t e s t  f o r  two independen t  samples was used to  
examine the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between th e  t e s t - g r o u p  and each o f  th e  con­
t r o l  t r o u p s .  Each c o n t ro l  group showed movements no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from th e  t e s t - g r o u p  a t  th e  .05 l e v e l .
However, t h e  r e s u l t s  r e p o r t e d  in  th e se  o b s e rv a t io n s  can on ly  
be cons ide red  a f t e r  th e  t e s t - g r o u p  f irms have been p a i r ed  with  com­
pan ies  in both o f  the  two co n t ro l  groups .  The pe rcen tages  o f  s im i ­
l a r i t i e s  in  a c tu a l  r a t i o  changes between th e  two c o n t ro l  groups and 
th e  t e s t - g r o u p  a r e  sm a l l .  T h e re fo re ,  movements in  the  t e s t - g r o u p ' s  
r a t i o s  appear  to  be caused by f a c t o r s  o t h e r  than th o se  p r e s e n t  in  
e i t h e r  o f  th e  two co n t ro l  groups.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY, AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE STUDY
This s tu d y  has observed f i f t e e n  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  o f  67 co rpo ra ­
t i o n s  which i n i t i a t e d  pens ion p lans  f o r  t h e i r  employees between 1969 
and 1974. The y e a r  o f  p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  was de f ined  in  t h i s  s tudy  as 
th e  f i r s t  y e a r  pension da ta  appeared on th e  t e s t - g r o u p  f i r m s '  pub l i shed  
income s t a t e m e n t s .  F i f t e e n  r a t i o s  were grouped . in to  t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  
( p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  and l i q u i d i t y ) ,  f o r  th e  purpose 
o f  o b se rv in g  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  on f irms f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e ­
ments .
The Conclusions o f  th e  Study
1. P r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  in  t h i s  s tudy,was measured by e i g h t  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
r a t i o s .  Pension p l a n s ,  in  most c a s e s ,  had no o b se rv a b le  e f f e c t s  on 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  When e f f e c t s  were o b s e rv a b le ,  most o f  t h e s e  were 
p o s i t i v e .  T h e re fo re ,  no p r o f i t a b i l i t y  e f f e c t s  a r e  ap p a ren t  a f t e r  the  
i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a pension p la n .
2. Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  measured by f iv e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s ,  most 
f r e q u e n t l y  i n d i c a t e d  no o b se rv ab le  e f f e c t s  when pens ion plans  were 
s t a r t e d .  However, when t r e n d s  o f  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  were obse rved ,  
most o f  th e se  o b se rv a b le  e f f e c t s  were p o s i t i v e .  T h e re fo re ,  no la b o r  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  e f f e c t s  a r e  ap p a re n t  a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a pension 
p la n .
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3. L iq u i d i t y  was measured by two l i q u i d i t y  r a t i o s .  As with  th e  
o t h e r  two r a t i o  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  most o f  t h e  companies '  r a t i o s  i n d i ­
c a te d  n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor  a n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  a f t e r  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  
a pens ion p l a n .  In i n s t a n c e s  when e f f e c t s  on l i q u i d i t y  were o bse rva ­
b l e ,  most were p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s .  T h e re fo re ,  no l i q u i d i t y  e f f e c t s  a r e  
a p p a re n t  a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  a pension p lan .
4 .  Most f r e q u e n t l y ,  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  c o s t  o f  pension plans  a r e  
no t  o b s e rv a b le .  When the  r a t i o s '  t r e n d s  a r e  o b s e rv a b le ,  most o f  th e se  
a r e  p o s i t i v e .  T h e re fo re ,  f o r  th e  f i rm s  examined, the  b e n e f i t s  to  the  
f i rms i n i t i a t i n g  pension plans  appear  to  be e i t h e r  a t  l e a s t  equal to  
th e  c o s t  o f  th e se  pension b e n e f i t  p l a n s ,  o r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no r e l a t i o n ­
s h ip  between the  changes in  th e  s tu d i e d  r a t i o s  and t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  
pension p l a n s .
The E f f e c t s  on P r o f i t a b i l i t y
When examining p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a f t e r  beginning  pension p lans  in  
t h e  t e s t  group f i r m s ,  most (81 p e rc e n t )  o f  the  companies '  r a t i o s  appear  
no t  to  i n d i c a t e  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s .  The t e s t - g r o u p ,  co n t ro l  group one,  
and co n t ro l  group two a l l  seem to  i n d i c a t e  the  same r a t i o  movements 
(over  o n e - h a l f  wi th  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  and approx im ate ly  o n e - f i f t h  nega­
t i v e ) .  However, in  a c l o s e r  exam ina t ion ,  when p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  
changed a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  pension p l a n s ,  few o f  th e se  r a t i o s  
changed l i k e  e i t h e r  con t ro l  group one o r  co n t ro l  group two f i r m s .  In 
most c a s e s ,  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  seemed u n a f fe c te d  o r  p o s i t i v e l y  a f f e c t e d  
by pension p lan  i n i t i a t i o n s .
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Pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n s  appear  no t  to  have had n eg a t iv e  e f ­
f e c t s  on c o r p o r a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  in  the  s h o r t - r u n .  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  r a t i o s  
a re  measures o f  th e  o v e r a l l  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the  f i r m s .  Thus, p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
r a t i o s  in c lu d e  the  e f f e c t s  o f  both th e  pension expense and l a b o r ' s  
r e a c t i o n s  to  t h e  p l a n ' s  i n i t i a t i o n s .  Since n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t s  were no t  
g e n e r a l l y  n o t ic e d  in  t h e s e  r a t i o s ,  i t  would appear  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
o f  the  plan may be a t  l e a s t  compensating f o r  th e  a d d i t i o n a l  c o s t  o f  
pension fund ing .
The E f f e c t s  on Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y
Five l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  were computed f o r  th e  companies 
which i n i t i a t e d  pension p la n s .  Most o f  t h e s e  r a t i o s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  
th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  pension plans  had n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor a nega­
t i v e  e f f e c t  on l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Four o f  th e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  measures 
have o p e r a t in g  expenses as the  numera tor .  Two o f  th e se  inc luded  pension 
c o s t  and two d id  n o t .  The r a t i o s  in c lu d in g  pension c o s t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  
r e a c te d  th e  same as th e  r a t i o s  exc lud ing  pension c o s t .
Most o f  th e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  (80 p e rc en t )  do no t  appear  
to  i n d i c a t e  n eg a t iv e  pension plan e f f e c t s .  T h e re fo re ,  companies 
i n i t i a t i n g  pension plans  appear  no t  to  have exper ienced  n eg a t iv e  e f f e c t s  
on l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Labor p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  a r e  more s p e c i f i c  in  
t h e i r  measurements than  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  measures .  The l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
measures c o n c e n t r a t e  on o p e r a t in g  expenses .  The expenses measured in 
t h i s  s tudy  a r e  examined both in c lu d in g  and excluding  pension c o s t .  Be­
cause th e se  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s  do no t  appear  to  be g e n e r a l ly
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n e g a t i v e l y  a f f e c t e d ,  t h e  in c r e a se d  o p e r a t in g  expenses caused by the  
implementat ion o f  pension plans  appear  to  be a t  l e a s t  o f f s e t  by 
in c re a se d  b e n e f i t s  to  th e  f i rm .
The E f f e c t s  on L i q u id i ty
Two measures  were used in  observ ing  l i q u i d i t y  changes as  a r e s u l t  
o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n .  Almost tw o - th i rd s  o f  the  r a t i o s  o f  the  
t e s t - g r o u p  f irms in d i c a t e d  n e i t h e r  p o s i t i v e  nor  n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s  a f t e r  
pension p lans  were s t a r t e d .  Of the  r a t i o s  which did  change,  a lmost  
tw ice  as  many r a t i o s  exper ienced  p o s i t i v e  l i q u i d i t y  e f f e c t s  as e x p e r i ­
enced n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t s .
Most f r e q u e n t l y  (87 pe rc en t  o f  the  c a s e s ) ,  no obse rv ab le  nega­
t i v e  e f f e c t s  were p r e s e n t  a f t e r  f i rms i n i t i a t e d  pension p l a n s .  Since 
pension plans  do cause o u t f lo w s ,  f i rms  must have reduced o t h e r  c u r r e n t  
a s s e t  o u t f lo w s ,  o r  reduced th e  use o f  c u r r e n t  l i a b i l i t i e s .  These 
reduced e x p en d i tu re s  could  p o s s ib ly  have r e s u l t e d  from in c re a se d  
l a b o r  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d /o r  reduced t u r n o v e r .  This was a l so  i n d i c a t e d  by 
the  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s .
The Im p l i c a t io n s  o f  the  Study
F inanc ia l  in fo rm a t io n  from 67 m anufac tur ing  f i rm s  was examined to  
de termine  i f  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  th e se  f i rms i n i t i a t i n g  pension plans  was 
ob se rv ab le  in f i n a n c i a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  The examination in d i c a t e d  t h a t  
most f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  showed n e i t h e r  a p o s i t i v e  nor  a n e g a t iv e  movement 
in  the  s h o r t - r u n  because o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n .  The e f f e c t s  t h a t  
were obse rv ab le  were a lm os t  always p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s .  This was t r u e  in 
a l l  t h r e e  r a t i o  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .  T h e re fo re ,  f i rms  appear  not  to  be
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a f f e c t e d  by pension p lan  i n i t i a t i o n  in  th e  s h o r t - r u n .
Pension p lans  b e n e f i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  employees and t h e i r  s e c u r i t y  
a t  r e t i r e m e n t  age .  Employee pens ion plans can o f f e r  f i n a n c i a l  r e t u r n s  
to  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  B e n e f i t s  to  the  employees should  a id  in  
r each ing  many o f  th e  o r g a n i z a t i o n s '  g o a l s .  Companies a r e  aware o f  t h i s  
f a c t .  When making c a p i t a l  inves tm ent  d e c i s i o n s ,  c o rp o ra te  a d m i n i s t r a ­
t i o n s  e v a lu a t e  t h e  expected  r e t u r n s  as  well as the  c o s t  o f  th e  i n v e s t ­
ment.  Unless th e  expec ted  b e n e f i t s  a r e  a t  l e a s t  equal to  t h e  c o s t ,  t h e  
company would n o t  make th e  inves tm en t .  This c o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  
a l so  a p p l i c a b l e  to  employee b e n e f i t s  in v e s tm e n t s .  Management i s  i n t e r ­
e s te d  in r e co v e r in g  i t s  i n v e s te d  c o s t  and ea rn ing  f i n a n c i a l  b e n e f i t s  
from "employee" i n v e s tm e n t s ,  as well  as c a p i t a l  i n v es tm en ts .  The 
r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s tudy  seem to  i n d i c a t e  t h a t ,  in  most c a s e s ,  th e  b e n e f i t s  
o f  pension plans  o f f e r e d  to  company employees a t  l e a s t  equal t h e i r  
c o s t ,  o r  t h a t  no r e l a t i o n s h i p  e x i s t s  between th e  changes in  th e  
s tu d i e d  r a t i o s  and th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  th e  pension p l a n .  This appears  
to  be evidenced in  companies'  f i n a n c i a l  s ta t em e n t s  by the  f a c t  t h a t  
most f irms i n i t i a t i n g  pension p lans  a r e  e i t h e r  e s s e n t i a l l y  unchanged, 
o r  improve t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  r a t i o s  a f t e r  p lan  i n i t i a t i o n .
C o s t / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  widely  used in  an a ly ses  by bus iness  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  As mentioned in  Chapter  I ,  pens ion c o s t s  a r e  m a te r ia l  
and becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y  a major  e x p e n d i tu re  o f  b u s in e s s e s .  The r e ­
s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s tudy  seem to  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  from i n i t i a t i n g  
employee pension p lans  a r e  a l s o  l a r g e  and,  in  most o f  t h e  cases  examined, 
th e  b e n e f i t s  appeared to  a t  l e a s t  equal th e  p en s io n s '  c o s t .
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The L im i ta t io n s  o f  t h e  Study
The c o n c lu s io n s  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  must be accep ted  1n r e l a t i o n  to  
t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  th e  methodology.  All companies used in  the  t h r e e  
groups were COMPUSTAT f i r m s ,  and t h e i r  f i n a n c i a l  d a ta  were taken  from 
t h e s e  t a p e s .  COMPUSTAT firms a r e ,  in  many c a s e s ,  o l d e r  and l a r g e r  
c o r p o r a t i o n s .  Younger and s m a l l e r  companies may no t  be a f f e c t e d  by 
pension i n i t i a t i o n s  in  th e  same manner.
The co n c lu s io n s  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  should no t  be cons ide red  to  
have p r e d i c t i v e  a b i l i t y ,  nor  i n d i c a t e  what would happen to  s p e c i f i c  f i rms 
when they  i n s t i t u t e  pension p lans  f o r  t h e i r  employees. Even though 
r a t i o  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n s  and moving-average computa t ions  were u t i l i z e d ,  
the  c o nc lus ions  must be l i m i t e d  to  th e  t ime per iod  examined. In 1974, 
t h e  Pension Reform Act was p assed .  This l e g i s l a t i o n  a f f e c t e d  th e  a c ­
c oun t ing  f o r  pens ion funds ,  as well  as a c t i o n s  o f  th e  g r a n t in g  company. 
Many companies in the  m id-1970 's  t e rm in a te d  t h e i r  pension b e n e f i t  
p l a n s .  This a c t i o n  was most l i k e l y  a r e s u l t  o f  the  requ irem ents  
i n s t i t u t e d  by th e  Pension Reform Act.
The conc lus ions  o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  cannot  be assumed to  be o p p o s i t e  
f o r  those  f irms which h a l t e d  t h e i r  pension p l a n s .  In th e  even t  t h a t  
f i r m s '  pens ion p lans  were t e r m in a t e d ,  t h e  p lan was most l i k e l y  r ep la c ed  
by some o t h e r  compensating employee b e n e f i t .  This  a c t i o n  could cancel 
th e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  decreased  b e n e f i t s .  No examination was made o f  
th e se  f i rms  s i n c e  the  massive t e rm in a t io n  o f  plans  in  t h e  mid -1970 's  
has r e s u l t e d  in  l i t t l e  accoun t ing  da ta  being a v a i l a b l e  f o r  o b se rv a ­
t i o n .
7 0
The f i v e  r a t i o s  used in  obse rv ing  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  a r e  only  
s u r r o g a t e s  f o r  a c tu a l  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  e f f e c t s .  P r o d u c t i v i t y  would 
b e s t  be measured by o u tp u t  per  employee-hour . However, t h i s  s tudy 
u t i l i z e d  on ly  f i n a n c i a l  in fo rm a t io n .  O pera t ing  expenses and o p e ra t in g  
expenses minus pension c o s t  were used as  numerators  in  fo u r  o f  the  
f i v e  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r a t i o s .  Total  l a b o r  c o s t  was used as the  
f i n a n c i a l  da ta  s u r r o g a t e  f o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  in previous  l a b o r - r e l a t e d  
r e s e a r c h .  Opera t ing  expenses were used in  t h i s  s tudy  because l a b o r  
c o s t  da ta  a r e  no t  g e n e r a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  and o p e r a t in g  expense d a ta  a re  
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  The ex t raneous  f a c t o r s  and in f lu e n c e s  p r e s e n t  in 
" o p e ra t in g  expenses" may have b iased  the  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  s tu d y .
Pension p l a n s ,  as well as o t h e r  l a b o r  b e n e f i t s ,  can a f f e c t  
employees1 b eh av io r .  Employee m ora le ,  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and tu rn o v e r  
a r e  t h r e e  a r e a s  t h a t  could  be a f f e c t e d  by implementing a pension p l a n .  
This r e s e a r c h  c e n te r e d  on th e  o b se rv ab le  e f f e c t s  on companies’ f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t e m e n t s ,  and did n o t  d i r e c t l y  s tudy  th e  e f f e c t s  on employee b eh av io r .
Three-year  moving-average r a t i o s  were u t i l i z e d  in  t h i s  s tudy 
f o r  the  purpose o f  reduc ing  I n d iv i d u a l - f i r m  and economy-wide e f f e c t s .  
This s tudy  i s  p r im a r i l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in  d e t e c t i n g  any s i g n i f i c a n t  r a t i o  
v a r i a t i o n s  due to  pens ion plan im plem enta t ion ,  while  ig n o r in g  o t h e r  
v a r i a t i o n s .  This  n e ce s sa ry  r a t i o  smoothing could  have,  however, 
camouflaged the  e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan i n i t i a t i o n s .
This s t u d y ' s  o b s e rv a t io n s  o f  accoun t ing  r a t i o s  examined only  
the  movements o f  v a r io u s  r a t i o s  in  th e  s h o r t - r u n ,  i . e . ,  th e  s h o r t -  
run e f f e c t s  o f  pension plan  i n i t i a t i o n s .  Long-term o b s e rv a t io n s  may
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dem onstra te  t h a t  r a t i o s  o f  f irms which begin pension p lans  move a c ro ss  
time to  become more l i k e  f irms  which have had pension b e n e f i t  plans 
f o r  a long pe r iod  o f  t im e .
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A c o n ta in s  a l i s t  o f  a l l  o f  th e  companies included 
in the  samples u t i l i z e d  in  t h i s  s tu d y .  The companies a re  l i s t e d  
by t h e i r  t h r e e  sample groups:  th e  t e s t - g r o u p  ( f i rm s  which began
r e p o r t i n g  pension c o s t ) ;  con t ro l  group one ( f i rms no t  i n d i c a t i n g  
pension c o s t ) ;  and co n t ro l  group two (companies which r e p o r t e d  
pension c o s t  th roughou t  th e  t ime pe r iod  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ) .
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COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE TEST-GROUP
Bates Mfg. Co. ,  Inc .
Dome Petro leum, Ltd.
North Canadian 011s ,  Ltd .  
Ranger O i l ,  Ltd .
Reserve Oil and Gas 
Scurry-Rainbow O i l , Ltd. 
Technical  O p e ra t io n s ,  In c .  
Zapata Corp.
Anthony I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .  
Federal  Co.
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, In c .  
Russe ll  S tover  Candies ,  In c .  
Avondale M i l l s  
Opel ika  Mfg. Corp.
Donnkenny, In c .
L i l l i  Ann Corp.
Lynnwear Corp.
Marlene I n d u s t r i e s  Corp. 
P ioneer  Systems,  In c .
P u r i t a n  Fashions  Corp.
S a l a n t  Corp.
Wilson Bro the rs  
G e o r g i a -P a c i f i c  Corp.
Ply-Gem I n d u s t r i e s  
Pen t ro l  I n d u s t r i e s  
New I d r i a ,  I n c .
Domtar, In c .
Technical Tape, I n c .
Fairmont Chemical Co. ,  I n c .
Belco Petroleum Corp.
B r i t i s h  Petroleum Co.
Crys ta l  Oil Co.
Holly Corp.
Husky Oil Ltd .
Cetec Corp.
G en s ta r ,  Ltd.
Welded Tube o f  America 
Con t inen ta l  M a te r i a l s  Corp. 
Rusco I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .
Signode Corp.
Massey Ferguson, Ltd.
Unarco I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .
Omark I n d u s t r i e s
New Hampshire Ball  Bearings
R i ley  Co.
Burgess I n d u s t r i e s  
U. S. F i l t e r  Corp.
Dataproducts  Corp.
Thomas I n d u s t r i e s  
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co.
Sony Corp.
Conrac Corp.
J e t r o n i c  I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .
Servo Corp. o f  America 
E l e c t r o n i c  Engineering  Co. 
S e a l e c t r o  Corp.
Sigma Ins t rum ents  
Safeguard  I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .  
S tandard  Motor P ro d u c ts ,  In c .  
United A i r c r a f t  P ro d u c ts ,  I n c .  
Fleetwood E n te r p r i s e s  
Systron-Donner Corp.
Fluke (John) Mfg. Co.
Anken I n d u s t r i e s  
T a l ley  I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .
VSI Corp. 
le Corp.
COMPANIES INCLUDED IN CONTROL GROUP ONE
Natomas Co*
Barnwel1 I n d u s t r i e s  
Conso l ida ted  Oil and Gas Co. 
B u t te s  Gas and Oil Co.
Numac Oil and Gas 
S t a n d a r d - P a c i f i c  Corp.
B lu eb i rd ,  In c .
C o u r tau ld s ,  Ltd.
A1ba-Waldensian, In c .
Angelica Corp.
L e s l i e  Fay, In c .
Brody (B) S ea t in g  Co.
Bowater Corp . ,  Ltd,
A lc o la c ,  In c .
Asamera Oil Corp.
K e l l e r  I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .
Cordon I n t i .
Tenney Eng inee r ing ,  In c .
Binks Mfg. Co.
Esquire  Radio and E l e c t r o n ,  Inc .
Watkins-Johnson
AAR Corp.
Nuclear  Data 
Hi-G, Inc .
S o l i t r o n  Devices ,  In c .
B ea r in g s ,  I n c .
Napco I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .
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COMPANIES INCLUDED TN CONTROL GROUP TWO
Kaneb S e r v i c e s ,  I n c .
Louis iana  Land and Exp lo ra t ion  
Felmont Oil Co.
Apache Corp.
General American Oil Co. o f  Texas 
Home Oil Co.
Morrison-Knudsen 
Hormel (Geo. A.) and Co.
T o o ts ie  Roll I n d u s t r i e s ,  I n c .  
MacAndrews and Forbes 
Reeves B r o th e r s ,  In c .
L ib e r ty  F ab r ic s  o f  N. Y. ,  In c .  
Garan,  I n c .
Movie S t a r ,  In c .
Adams-Mill is  Corp.
Wayne-Gossard Corp.
Munsingwear,  I n c .
J a n tz e n ,  In c .
Bobbie Brooks, Inc .
Russ Togs, in c .
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Pope and T a lb o t ,  Inc .
Cosco, I n c .
American S e a t in g  Co.
Great  Northern  Nekoosa Corp. 
G l a t f e l t e r  (P. H.) Co.
Park Chemical Co.
Clark  Oil and Ref in ing  Corp. 
S tandard  Oil Co. ( In d ian a )
Bow V al ley  I n d u s t r i e s




U. S. Gypsum Co.
Hofmann I n d u s t r i e s ,  In c .  
Bernz-O-Matic Corp.
E as te rn  Co.
CECO Corp.
P o r te c ,  Inc .
McNeil Corp.
T e le f l e x ,  In c .
P a rker -H ann i f in  Corp.
Buffa lo  Forge Co.
Peabody I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corp.
Barry Wright  Corp.
E sq u i re ,  In c .
L a fa y e t t e  Radio E le c t r o n ic  Corp. 
Zenith  Radio Corp.
Motoro la ,  In c .
H a r r i s  Corp.
Spar ton Corp.
GTI Corp.
Unimax Group, In c .
Lynch Corp.
Kysor I n d u s t r i a l  Corp.
Standard Products  Co.
Maul Technology Corp.
I n s t r o n  Corp.
Hunt ( P h i l i p  A.) Chemical 
Bulova Watch Co.
American Technical I n d u s t r i e s
APPENDIX B
Appendix B contains  a l i s t  o f  each o f  the 15 r a t i o s  u t i l i z e d  
in t h i s  s tudy.  The r a t i o s  a re  c l a s s i f i e d  in to  th re e  groups: 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  labo r  p ro d u c t iv i ty ,  and l i q u i d i t y .  A l i s t i n g  
o f  the  number o f  firms in each o f  the  sample groups in d ica t in g  
p o s i t i v e ,  nega t ive ,  and n e i th e r  p o s i t iv e  nor negat ive  movements 
appears with each o f  the r a t i o s .
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THE EFFECTS OF PENSION PLAN INITIATIONS ON EACH OF THE 
THREE SAMPLE GROUPS FIRMS' RATIOS
P o s i t i v e
E f f e c t s
Negat ive
E f f e c t s
N e i the r  P o s i t i v e  
nor Negat ive 
Movements Total
P r o f i t a b i l i t y  Ratios  
OP/SE
Test-Group 20 14 33 67
Control Group One 6 4 17 27
Control Group •Two 17 13 33 62
OP/TA
Test-Group 22 11 34 67
Control Group One 6 5 16 27
Control Group Two 17 11 34 62
OP/NS
Test-Group 16 13 38 67
Control Group One 4 5 18 27
Control Group Two 16 14 32 62
NS/TA
Test-Group 16 15 36 67
Control Group One 5 6 16 27
Control Group Two 8 7 47 62
CF/SE
Test-Group 24 11 32 67
Control Group One 8 3 16 27
Control Group Two 18 8 36 62
CF/TA
Test-Group 15 9 43 67
Control Group One 4 8 15 • 27
Control Group Two 17 10 35 62
CF/NS
Test-Group 16 14 37 67
Control Group One 5 4 18 27
Control Group Two 21 14 27 62
EPS
Test-Group 12 10 45 67
Control Group One 10 5 12 27
Control Group Two 12 12 33 62
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THE EFFECTS OF PENSION PLAN INITIATIONS ON EACH OF THE THREE SAMPLE 
GROUPS FIRMS' RATIOS' (con t inued)
N e i th e r  P o s i t i v e  
P o s i t i v e  Negat ive nor  Negative 
E f f e c t s  E f f e c t s  Movements To ta ls
Labor P r o d u c t i v i t y  Rat ios  
OE/CGS
Test-Group 18 15 34 67
Control Group One 3 8 16 27
Control Group Two 12 10 40 62
OE-P/CGS
Test-Group 16 13 38 67
Control Group One 2 9 16 27
Control Group Two 13 10 39 62
OE/NS
Test-Group 16 13 38 67
Control Group One 2 10 15 27
Control Group Two 9 8 45 62
OE-P/NS
Test-Group 17 17 34 67
Control Group One 3 10 14 27
Control Group Two 11 10 41 62
NS/SE
Test-Group 13 10 44 67
Control Group One 11 3 13 27
Control  Group Two 13 12 37 62
L iq u i d i t y  Rat ios
CR
Test-Group 16 10 41 67
Control Group One 7 4 16 27
Control Group Two 22 9 31 62
DPS
Test-Group 16 8 43 67
Control  Group One 7 3 17 27
Control  Group Two 15 18 29 62
APPENDIX C
The graphs presented in the appendix a re  p lo ts  o f  four t e s t -  
group f i rm s .  Also presented are  the p lo t s  o f  r a t i o s  o f  the 
te s t -g ro u p  f irms '  r e sp e c t iv e  matched-pairs  from control  group 
one and control  group two f irms.  The year  o f  pension plan I n i t i a ­
t io n  i s  in d ic a ted  on the X-axis o f  each o f  the  t e s t -g ro u p  f i rm s '  
g raphs ;  The graphs are  presented in the following sequence: the  
te s t -g ro u p  f i rm ,  the matched-pair firm from control  group one 
(firms without  pension p la n s ) ,  and f i n a l l y ,  the  matched-pair  firm 
from control  group two (f irms with pension p la n s ) .  The s p e c i f i c  
r a t i o s  p lo t t e d  on each graph are  ind ica ted  in the legend a t  the 
bottom o f  each graph.
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Charles  Bruce Swindle,  th e  au th o r  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  was 
born on June 1 ,  1951 in B as t rop ,  Lou is iana .  His p a r e n t s  a r e  
Moody and E la in e  Swindle . He graduated  from Ouachi ta  P a r i sh  
High School in 1968. He graduated  with a Bachelor  o f  Sc ience  in 
Accounting in  January  1972 and a Master o f  Business Adm in is t ra ­
t i o n  in  May 1973. Both o f  th e se  degrees were earned from North­
e a s t  Louisiana U n iv e r s i t y .
The au th o r  worked in  pu b l ic  accoun t ing  and p r i v a t e  acco u n t in g .  
A f te r  complet ing h is  M.B.A., t h e  au th o r  was an I n s t r u c t o r  o f  
Accounting a t  McNeese S t a t e  U n iv e r s i ty  fo r  two y e a r s .  A f te r  
l e a v in g  McNeese, th e  w r i t e r  r e tu rn e d  to  school as a f u l l - t i m e  
d o c to ra l  c a n d id a te .  He i s  p r e s e n t l y  a member o f  the  American 
Accounting A s so c ia t io n  and an a s s o c i a t e  member of  th e  Nat ional 
A sso c ia t io n  o f  A ccountan ts .
Bruce Swindle i s  m arr ied  to t h e  former Debra Lynne M iles ,  and 
has one d a u g h te r ,  A l i c i a  Marie.
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